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GOOD COP, BAD COP:
MARKET COMPETITORS, UDAP CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS, AND THE
U.S. MORTGAGE CRISIS
James J. Pulliam*
State unfair or deceptive acts or practices statutes (UDAPs) offer
consumers broad protections against abusive business activity.
However, although UDAPs could have been used to combat predatory
lending during the housing bubble, the laws generally failed to detour
the predatory lending that fueled the mortgage crisis. One reason that
UDAPs did not play a bigger role in litigating against predatory
lending is that states limit or deny UDAP standing for business
competitors. Because businesses often lack a transactional nexus with
other competitor businesses in their marketplaces, this Article argues
that UDAPs should provide businesses with representative standing
free of an injury-in-fact requirement. This reform would allow
businesses that suffer a diminished capacity to compete when their
competitors act in unfair ways to engage in industry self-policing by
using UDAPs to litigate against abusive business practices in their
marketplaces.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1993 to 2007, Fremont Investment & Loan ("Fremont"),'
was one of the most pervasive subprime 2  lenders in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Between January 2004 and
March 2007, Fremont originated 14,578 owner-occupied home
mortgages in the state.4 The majority of these loans were subprime,
and nearly all of them were quickly unloaded on the secondary
market. More importantly, these loans were not designed to foster
stable homeownership.6 By the end of 2007, fewer than 2,000
Fremont-originated Massachusetts loans remained in existence-the
rest having ended through refinance, sale, or foreclosure.' Of the
remaining 2,000 mortgages, nearly a quarter were in default.'
After more than 6,500 Massachusetts family homes were lost to
foreclosure,' the state's Attorney General finally took action.'o In
1. Chartered in California, Fremont originated residential mortgages nationwide. Amended
Brief of Defendant-Appellant Fremont Investment & Loan at 5-6, Commonwealth v. Fremont
Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008) (No. 10258), 2008 WL 4296889 [hereinafter
Amended Brief of Fremont]; Brief of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 8-9,
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008) (No. 10258), 2008 WL
4448973 [hereinafter Brief of Commonwealth]. In March 2007, Fremont exited the home-loan
business after settling federal claims of unsound and illegal lending practices. Brief of
Commonwealth, supra, at 9; Amended Brief of Fremont, supra, at 6 n.3. In June 2008, Fremont
filed for bankruptcy. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d at 548 n. 1.
2. For an explanation of the differences between prime and subprime lenders, see note 76
and accompanying text, infra.
3. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d at 550-52; CHRISTOPHER L. FOOTE ET AL., FED.
RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, SUBPRIME FACTS: WHAT (WE THINK) WE KNOW ABOUT THE
SUBPRIME CRISIS AND WHAT WE DON'T 13 (2008); Kimberly Blanton, Subprime Lender Sued
Under Predator Law; AG Accuses Fremont of 'Worst Practices,' BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 6, 2007,
at C1O.
4. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d at 551.
5. Id. at 551-52 & n.7.
6. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge
Fund Industry: Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 359,
391-96 (2009).
7. Brief of Commonwealth, supra note 1, at 13-14.
8. Id.
9. Kimberly Blanton, Ex-Fremont Pair Offer Inside Look at Lender: Aggressive Sales
Tactics, Brokers Cited in State Fraud Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2008, at DI.
10. See Complaint at 1, Commonwealth v. H & R Block, Inc., No. 2008-2474 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Jan. 3, 2008), 2008 WL 6008126; Complaint at 1, Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan,
No. 07-4373-F (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2007), 2007 WL 5180872; William M. Bulkeley,
Goldman Settles Subprime Inquiry-Bank's Agreement with Massachusetts Requires Relief of
1254
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Commonwealth v. Fremont Investment & Loan," the Attorney
General brought suit against Fremont, alleging that its lending
practices violated Massachusetts's unfair and deceptive acts or
practices statute.12 In ruling against Fremont, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of injunctive relief
enjoining the foreclosure of Fremont loans with certain
characteristics that "doomed [the mortgages] to foreclosure.""
The Massachusetts law at issue in Fremont Investment & Loanl4
is one example of state unfair or deceptive acts or practices statutes
(UDAPs) that are designed to protect consumers and business
competitors from unfair business activity." However, these statutes
proved ineffective during the recent mortgage crisis, because they
failed to sufficiently deter the widespread predatory lending that
harmed individual borrowers and contributed to the excessive
speculation and risky lending that caused the broader financial
meltdown. 6 While the application of Massachusetts's UDAP in
Fremont Investment & Loan prevented imminent foreclosure for
some homeowners," its overall effectiveness was too limited to halt
the spread of foreclosures that led to the broader economic crisis."
$60 Million, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2009, at C3 (detailing a 2009 settlement between
Massachusetts and Goldman Sachs for securitizing unfair loans).
11. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BLSI, 2008 WL 517279 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 2008), affd, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008).
12. Id. at*1.
13. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 554 (Mass. 2008); Fremont
Inv. & Loan, 2008 WL 517279, at *1, *10; see also infra Part II.C (discussing the court's
decision in more detail).
14. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (2006).
15. See, e.g., Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are Saying Is Give Business a Chance:
The Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business-to-Business Transactions, 15 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 81, 81-82 (2003); Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business Transactions:
A Proposal to Extend the Little FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1623-24
(1983) [hereinafter Toward Greater Equality].
16. See infra Part III.A. See generally DEAN BAKER, FALSE PROFITS: RECOVERING FROM
THE BUBBLE ECONOMY (2010) (discussing the causes and scope of the financial crisis); RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO
DEPRESSION (2009) (analyzing the origins of the current recession, and critiquing the government
and economic response); Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive Practice Enforcement in
Financial Institution Regulation, 30 PACE L. REV. 279 (2009) (positing that stronger enforcement
of consumer protection laws should be part of a restructured financial regulatory system).
17. The Fremont Investment & Loan injunction was issued on February 25, 2008 and
remained in place through the appellate process. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d at 553-55;
Fremont Inv. & Loan, 2008 WL 23 12648, at * 1. In 2009, Fremont settled with the Massachusetts
1255Summer 20 10]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW
Given that state UDAP statutes give courts broad authority to
protect consumers from the unfair or deceptive tactics employed in
predatory lending, why did they fail to stop the abusive business
practices that contributed to the mortgage crisis? One reason is that
relatively few plaintiffs successfully utilized UDAPs to challenge the
rise of risky and predatory lending in the years leading up to the
mortgage crisis. 9 This failure to litigate was due in part to the fact
that most UDAPs either limit or omit standing for a group of
potential plaintiffs who are arguably in the best position to make
effective and efficient use of UDAP claims-business competitors.20
By using California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL)2 1 as a
model through which to evaluate UDAP shortcomings, it is evident
that mortgage-market competitors2 2 were in the best position to
successfully use UDAPs to police their own marketplaces through
litigation. Compared to individual consumers and public law offices 23
(the two groups most frequently conferred with UDAP standing)
market competitors (1) are better able to quickly and accurately
identify and advocate against unfair business practices; (2) are
invested in securing stable and successful marketplaces, rather than
just remedying past wrongs; and (3) collectively have more resources
Attorney General for $10 million in damages, penalties, and costs. See Jennifer Levitz, Fremont
General Settles Deceptive-Loans Case, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2009, at C4.
18. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUs. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S
HOUSING 2009, at 2 (2009).
19. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 16, at 293-96 (surveying examples of successful state attorney
general litigation against predatory lending); infra Part III.A.
20. Flynn & Slater, supra note 15, at 87-89 (2003); D. Wes Sullenger, Only We Can Save
You: When and Why Non-Consumer Businesses Have Standing to Sue Business Competitors
Under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 485, 490-93 (2005); Toward
Greater Equality, supra note 15, at 1621, 1626-28; see also JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L.
CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 2.1.8, at 15-21 (6th ed. 2004)
(explaining how issues of statutory interpretation determine whether a transaction is a "consumer
transaction" for the purposes of UDAP standing).
21. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2006).
22. The terms "market competitors" and "business competitors" refer to the different
businesses that make up an industry. In the context of the mortgage market, market competitors
would include, for example, businesses engaged in lending, brokering loans, and appraising.
23. "Public law offices" refers to the offices of state attorneys general, county counsels,
district attorneys, city attorneys, and other state officials with authority to pursue UDAP
litigation. See ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR
COMPETITION ACT: CONUNDRUMS AND CONFUSIONS 1 (1995). Because UDAPs vary from state
to state, this general term is used to represent the public enforcement provisions of these statutes.
See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, §§ 10.2-10.7, at 931-64.
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to prosecute litigation.2 4 This Article therefore contends that UDAPs
could have been more successful at preventing the pervasive
predatory lending that contributed to the mortgage crisis if the
statutes had provided broader standing for market competitors.
Part II provides background on UDAP statutes, the mortgage
crisis, and predatory lending. Part III shows that while state UDAPs
can have positive regulatory effects on financial markets, they
generally limit standing for businesses in a harmful way. Part IV
offers a proposal for enhancing the effectiveness of UDAPs by
reforming UDAP standing for business litigants despite potential
limitations from state constitutions25 and federal preemption.26 Part V
concludes that the relaxation of standing requirements for businesses
would better equip UDAPs to achieve their statutory purpose of
preventing unfair business activity.
II. MORTGAGES, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND THE CRISIS
The recent collapse of the housing market has caused the worst
recession since the Great Depression,2 7 and predatory lending was a
key contributor to the crisis.2 8 Although various federal and state
statutes protect consumers from predatory lending in theory, these
regulations have generally failed to do so in practice.29 Designed to
24. See infra Part I.C. 1.
25. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
26. Federal preemption of state efforts to regulate the mortgage industry is an ongoing and
controversial issue. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2007); see also Keith
R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank Preemption of State
Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 981, 984-86 (2006) ("Early in 2004,
[the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency], . . . promulgated regulations purporting to
preempt all state laws that 'obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to fully
exercise' its federally granted powers. Even more controversially, the preemption applies whether
a national bank exercises such powers directly or through one or more state chartered operating
subsidiaries."); G. Marcus Cole, Protecting Consumers from Consumer Protection: Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 251, 251-53 (2007) ("[T]he issue in Watters v.
Wachovia Bank is actually a policy choice disguised as a doctrinal one. The real issue is whether
given our national credit markets, states should have extensive authority to impose cumbersome,
expensive, and, indeed, irrational regulation on operating subsidiaries of a national bank.").
However, current congressional proposals are exploring the curtailment of preemption in this area
as part of the federal legislative response to the mortgage crisis. See Consumer Financial
Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 11Ith Cong. § 141 (2009).
27. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at vii.
28. Cox, supra note 16, at 279.
29. See, e.g., Rayth T. Myers, Comment, Foreclosing on the Subprime Loan Crisis: Why
Current Regulations Are Flawed and What Is Needed to Stop Another Crisis from Occurring, 87
OR. L. REv. 311, 323-40 (2008).
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combat any type of abusive business practice, state UDAPs offer an
alternative mechanism to regulate the mortgage market.30
A. UDAPs and the UCL
UDAPs are foundational consumer protection laws that grew out
of the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act (the "FTC Act"). In
prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices,"" Congress
intentionally framed the FTC Act's language in broad terms so that
courts could develop and refine definitions of "unfair or deceptive
practices."" Nonetheless, Congress limited the FTC Act's
effectiveness by restricting its enforcement to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC)3 4: there is no private right of action, and there is
no public right of action for state or local governments.3 5
In the 1960s, the perceived inadequacies of common-law claims
and FTC regulation led states to enact UDAPs to provide a cause of
action against unfair business practices.3 6 As a result, all fifty states
now provide UDAP authority to their public law offices to
investigate and enjoin unfair or deceptive business practices" and
30. Jessica Fogel, Comment, State Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative Approach
to Solving the Problem of Predatory Mortgage Lending, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 459-65
(2005).
31. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)); Sullenger, supra note 20, at 489-93. The
FTC Act itself can be traced to common-law claims brought by market competitors for unfair
competition based on "trademark or trade name infringement." WILLIAM L. STERN, Bus. & PROF.
C. § 17200 PRACTICE ch. 2-A (2010); Wesley J. Howard, Note, Former Civil Code Section 3369:
A Study in Judicial Interpretation, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 705, 706-13 (1978).
32. See Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)) (amending the FTC Act of 1914). The 1914 Act
originally prohibited "unfair methods of competition in commerce." Federal Trade Commission
Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
33. STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-A.
34. See, e.g., ABA, FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 11-56 (2007).
35. See, e.g., MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE WHO
REPRESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 63-64 (1995); FELLMETH, supra note 23, at
5-6; see also Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp. 485 F.2d 986, 987, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
("[P]rivate actions to vindicate rights asserted under the Federal Trade Commission Act may not
be maintained."); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280-81 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The
protection against unfair trade practices afforded by the [FTC] Act vests initial remedial power
solely in the Federal Trade Commission.").
36. Toward Greater Equality, supra note 15, at 1625-26 (stating that there are three
principal policy rationales behind the adoption of the Little FTC Acts: (1) to rectify an
"imbalance of power in the marketplace"; (2) to "make litigating small claims economical"; and
(3) to further the effective enforcement of the law through the provision of a private remedy).
37. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 1.1, at 1.
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forty-nine of those states also include a private right of action for
such claims." While they vary greatly in structure,39 UDAPs are
generally patterned after similar model codes.40
California's UDAP, the UCL, provides an example of a typical
structure for a UDAP.41 The UCL prohibits "any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice."4 2 To prevail, a UCL plaintiff
must prove the following: (1) the defendant was engaged in a
business act or practice;43 and (2) the alleged conduct was (a)
unlawful, (b) unfair, or (c) fraudulent." UCL cases tasked with
defining a "business act or practice" have typically applied the term
to a broad range of conduct so as to give effect to the statutory
scheme's broad remedial purpose.4 5 Similarly, a single act is
sufficient to violate the UCL.46 Generally, a pattern of conduct is
relevant only when a court fashions remedial relief.47
38. Prentiss Cox, Goliath Has the Slingshot: Public Benefit and Private Enforcement of
Minnesota Consumer Protection Laws, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163, 167 (2006). Iowa is the
only state that omits a UDAP private right of action. Id.; SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20,
§§ 7.2.1-7.2.2, at 659-61.
39. See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, §§ 1.1-1.2, at 1-2 (providing a
1000+-page treatise on the nuances of UDAP schemes, and the depth of their jurisprudence).
40. Cox, supra note 38, at 166-67 (describing the four model codes and categorizing them
as (1) "general statutory fraud laws" or (2) "topical laws that regulate specific types of consumer
transactions"). Reliance on these model codes led many states to enact multiple UDAP schemes.
See Fogel, supra note 30, at 454. This Article focuses on general statutory fraud laws like
California's UCL. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2006).
41. However, despite sharing similar characteristics with other UDAPs, the UCL's history is
related to the FTC Act, but largely independent of the 1960s model codes. See FELLMETH, supra
note 23, at 2-15; STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 2-B-2-F; Howard, supra note 31, at 715-21.
42. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2006); STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 2-F.
43. STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-D-3-E.
44. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 249 (Cal. 2002); Joshua D. Taylor, Note, Why the
Increasing Role of Public Policy in Calfornia's Unfair Competition Law Is a Slippery Step in the
Wrong Direction, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1133-35 (2001). The UCL also prohibits "[u]nfair,
deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising" and "[a]ny act prohibited by [California Business &
Professions Code] §§ 17500-17577.5," but these latter two wrongs are duplicative of conduct
prohibited under the three primary provisions. STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-C (alteration and
emphasis omitted); Sharon J. Arkin, The Unfair Competition.Law After Proposition 64: Changing
the Consumer Protection Landscape, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 157-63 (2005).
45. STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-D.
46. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200; STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-E.
47. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204; STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-E.
1259
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The UCL provides standing for both public law offices and
private parties.48 However, private plaintiffs must show that they
have "suffered [an] injury in fact and . .. lost money or property as a
result of the unfair competition."4 9 This injury-in-fact requirement
limits standing to those consumers or businesses that are directly
harmed by the unlawful conduct, preventing individuals from
bringing suit on behalf of a different injured party." If UCL standing
requirements are satisfied and litigation is successful, a private
plaintiffs potential remedies are limited to equitable relief." Thus,
while restitution and injunctive relief are available, traditional
damages are not.52 Further, while not specifically provided for in the
statutory scheme, successful plaintiffs may recover attorney's fees if
the litigation furthers an important public interest."
Like many other UDAPs, the UCL prohibits three types of
conduct: unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent.5 4 The first type of conduct
for which the UCL creates a cause of action is "unlawful" conduct."
This general prohibition of illegal business practices means that a
plaintiff can bring or "borrow" a UCL claim where the defendant's
conduct violates some other law. 6 Under this provision, proof of the
48. The UCL empowers various public law offices with enforcement authority, including:
(1) the Attorney General; (2) district attorneys; and (3) any city attorney representing a city with a
population that exceeds 750,000. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204.
49. Id
50. See infra Part III.C.
51. Arkin, supra note 44, at 164-65. Many UDAPs do provide for monetary damage awards
in various forms. Although forty-nine states are uniform in providing for a UDAP private right of
action, they are substantially inconsistent in their treatment of available statutory remedies for
UDAP violations. See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, §§ 8.1-8.2, at 737-39
(surveying various statutory approaches for remedying UDAP violations); DEE PRIDGEN,
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW §§ 6.1-6.34 (2d ed. 2003) (same).
52. STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 8-A.
53. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 2010) (establishing four criteria under
California law for evaluating an appropriate shift of attorney's fees in the public's interest); see
also STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 8-A (examining the different theories by which a successful
UCL plaintiff can recover attorney's fees). Nationally, in UDAP litigation, "the prevailing
plaintiff is normally entitled to an award of reasonable fees and costs." PRIDGEN, supra note 51,
§§ 6.17-6.27; see also SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 8.8, at 796-834 (providing a
national overview of UDAP attorney's fees provisions).
54. These clauses are disjunctive. For example, "lawful" conduct can still be unfair or
fraudulent, and therefore illegal under the UCL. See STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-G.
55. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2006); STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-F.
56. See STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-F.
[Vol. 43:12511260
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violation of the borrowed law thus becomes a per se UCL violation."
For example, a plaintiff can formulate a UCL claim based on a
defendant's violation of a federal statute and regulation, an FTC
guideline or opinion, a state statute and regulation, a local ordinance,
judicial precedent, or perhaps a law of another jurisdiction."
The second type of conduct for which the UCL creates a cause
of action is "unfair" conduct.5 9 This provision allows courts to find a
business activity unfair, "even if [it is] not specifically proscribed by
some other law."60 Like the language of the FTC Act, the UCL
language was intentionally left broad by the legislature in order to
provide courts with the greatest ability and discretion to define
prohibited conduct.'
The third type of conduct for which the UCL creates a cause of
action is "fraudulent" business conduct.62 The term "fraudulent" has
been interpreted to mean business activity that is likely to deceive the
public.63 While application of this fraudulent-conduct restriction is
most frequently found in the context of false advertising,' UCL
claims for fraudulent practices need not involve advertising or false
statements.
57. See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, §§ 3.2.6-3.2.7, at 120-29 (surveying
jurisdictional approaches to UDAP prohibition of unlawful conduct).
58. STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-F. A successful UDAP "unlawful" claim can unlock
several advantages that may be unavailable under the borrowed law. See id at ch. 7-A; SHELDON
& CARTER, supra note 20, § 3.2.7.1, at 121.
59. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200; see also SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20,
§ 3.3.4.3, at 131 ("Over thirty UDAP statutes prohibit unfair practices and about ten UDAP
statutes proscribe unconscionable acts. Neither of these standards is precisely defined. Instead
they are expansive evolving concepts that can be used to challenge novel forms of consumer
abuse.").
60. Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 540 (Cal. 2002).
61. STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-G ("One advantage to plaintiffs in including an
'unfairness' claim is that [the UCL's] prohibition of 'unfair' practices sometimes can be used to
stretch statutory prohibitions beyond their express or technical limits.").
62. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200.
63. See Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668 (Cal.
1983). In contrast to common-law fraud claims, under the UCL "a plaintiff can prove a prima
facie case that a business practice is 'fraudulent' without having to prove intent, scienter, actual
reliance, or damage. Even actual deception is not required." STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-H; see
also SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 4.2.3.1, at 144 (describing the elements of common-
law fraud).
64. Arkin, supra note 44, at 161-63.
65. See, e.g., Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872, 882-85 (Ct.
App. 1988); STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 3-H.
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B. Federal and State Mortgage Regulations Proved
Ineffective at Mitigating Predatory Lending
The current mortgage crisis is the result of a housing bubble that
began in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 6  After American home
sales, ownership, and construction peaked in 2006-all hitting or
nearing historic highs6'-prices dropped and the bubble burst.68 A
$10 trillion industry in 1995,69 the housing market saw nearly $6
trillion in home equity evaporate." As the national foreclosure rate
tripled," the crisis spread to the financial markets,72 resulting in a
"$5.3 trillion plunge in the real value of stocks and mutual funds."73
Roughly 6 million Americans lost their jobs, while an additional 11
million were underemployed or had stopped looking for work.74 As
the severity of these consequences demonstrates, effective regulation
of home-mortgage lending is of critical importance.
1. Predatory Lending
A mortgage is a contract that conveys an interest in a piece of
land from a borrower to a lender as security for payment of a debt.
Generally, home loans are either "prime" or "subprime. "76 Although
66. See BAKER, supra note 16, at 17-26, 33-34.
67. Id. at 19-21, 26, 31 (noting how this growth occurred without corresponding increases in
income and population-the two demand factors that have historically driven increases in home
prices).
68. Id at 35; JOlNT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 18, at 1.
69. BAKER, supra note 16, at 18.
70. See id. at 35; JOINT CTR. FOR HoUs. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 18, at 9.
71. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 18, at 1-2.
72. See BAKER, supra note 16, at 33; JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV.,
supra note 18, at 2, 9.
73. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 18, at 13.
74. Id at 2 (citing statistics as of April 2009).
75. MARGARET C. JASPER, HOME MORTGAGE LAW PRIMER 5 (2000).
76. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics ofSubprime
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (2009). Prime loans offer a uniform low interest rate and are
issued only to borrowers with sufficiently high credit scores. See Baher Azmy, Squaring the
Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L.
REV. 295, 304 (2005). In contrast, subprime mortgages "are loans with higher interest rates ...
designed for borrowers with impaired credit or who do not otherwise qualify for loans in the
conventional prime market." Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:
The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2002). During the
housing bubble, Alt-A mortgages, which fit somewhere in between prime and subprime loans,
also developed as a significant source of risky lending. See Lauren E. Willis, Will the Mortgage
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the mortgage crisis is often tied to abuses in the subprime market,"
subprime and predatory loans are not always coextensive products."
Rather, for the purposes of UDAP litigation, the focus is on
"predatory lending," a term that collectively represents unfair
practices in the mortgage market.79
Predatory lending can occur at any stage of the lending process.
A typical borrower is obliged to interact with a mortgage broker, an
appraiser, a lender, and a servicer in a complex transaction involving
hundreds of thousands of dollars." When this transactional
complexity is paired with several layers of convoluted federal and
state regulations," even the most rational actors can struggle to
identify unfair practices." Thus it is extremely difficult to uniformly
define and identify the abusive business practices that contributed to
the mortgage crisis.8
In general, a mortgage can be predatory through either
substantive or procedural unfairness (unfair terms versus unfair sales
tactics).8 4 Predatory loans are substantively unfair when they are
either (1) "overpriced" or (2) "overly risky."" First, a loan is
overpriced when a borrower receives a loan with a higher interest
Market Correct? How Households and Communities Would Fare If Risk Were Priced Well, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1177, 1214 & nn.137-39 (2009).
77. See BAKER, supra note 16, at 26-33.
78. Azmy, supra note 76, at 303-04; Engel & McCoy, supra note 76, at 1261; cf SONIA
GARRISON ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CONTINUED DECAY AND SHAKY REPAIRS:
THE STATE OF SUBPRIME LOANS TODAY 3 (2009) (arguing that the subprime market has
ultimately resulted in a loss of wealth and a net decline in homeownership); Alan M. White,
Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract
Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2009) (positing that subprime mortgages "triggered
the broader credit crisis").
79. See Azmy, supra note 76, at 297-300; Engel & McCoy, supra note 76, at 1259-60;
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 738-41 (2006).
80. See JASPER, supra note 75, at 49-64; The Mortgage Professor's Website, Mortgage
Glossary, http://www.mtgprofessor.com/glossary.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
81. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 16, at 283-86; Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured
Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2225-32 (2007).
82. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 79, at 749-54.
83. Id at 735-36.
84. Azmy, supra note 76, at 332-43.
85. Willis, supra note 79, at 735-36.
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rate than one for which the borrower is otherwise qualified.8 6 This
happens when lenders give high-risk, high-cost subprime loans to
borrowers who are eligible for low-risk, low-cost prime loans, or
when lenders give subprime borrowers higher-risk, higher-cost
subprime loans than they are otherwise eligible to receive." For
example, one way in which a lender can overprice a loan is through
the use of yield-spread premiums-kickbacks from lenders to
brokers for selling borrowers higher-cost loans." Second,
substantively predatory loans are overly risky if they create a
heightened risk of foreclosure relative to other available
alternatives.89 An example of an overly risky loan term is an
excessive prepayment penalty that can be used to trap a borrower in a
loan with other abusive terms.9 0
Procedurally predatory loans are abusive not only because they
can result in overpriced or overly risky loans, but also because they
may (1) originate from fraudulent lending practices; (2) lack
transparency in outlining the terms of the mortgage; or (3) waive the
borrower's rights against the lender." First, the most obvious form of
86. Id at 736 ("An overpriced loan is priced higher than otherwise comparable loans that
were available on the market to the borrower and at a greater savings than the tangible search
costs that the borrower would have incurred by price shopping.").
87. Id.
88. See Mortgage Lending Reform: A Comprehensive Review of the American Mortgage
System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 11 Ith Cong. 2 (2009) (testimony of Julia Gordon, Senior Counsel,
Center for Responsible Lending) [hereinafter Hearing], available at http://www.
responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/congress/gordon-testimony-3-1-09-
final.pdf. Yield-spread premiums theoretically allow a borrower to defer a mortgage broker's loan
origination costs by spreading the fees over the life of the loan in the form of a higher annual
percentage rate (APR). However, in practice, they create perverse incentives for mortgage brokers
to steer borrowers into higher-cost loans in exchange for substantial payments from the lender.
Id.; see also Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of
Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 308-12 (2007) (summarizing the various
arguments in defense of and against yield spread premiums).
89. Willis, supra note 79, at 736 ("Overly risky loans are loans that leave the borrower in the
position of such a risk of default and loss of equity in the home that the loan itself is financially
unwise and would not have been taken but for exploitation of borrower vulnerabilities.").
90. See Hearing, supra note 88, at 2. Prepayment penalties are theoretically used by lenders
to ensure recovery of loan origination costs if a borrower prematurely ends a loan through
repayment or refinance. See, e.g., Robert K. Baldwin, Prepayment Penalties: A Survey and
Suggestion, 40 VAND. L. REV. 409, 414-19 (1987). However, in the context of the mortgage
crisis, prepayment penalties that were higher or longer than justified by the loan's origination
costs were used to exact harmful rents from borrowers forced to refinance out of abusive loans.
Azmy, supra note 76, at 339-40; Hearing, supra note 88.
91. Engel & McCoy, supra note 76, at 1260.
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predatory lending is fraudulent lending, which can take any number
of forms.92 Second, even if a loan is not fraudulent and complies with
all legal requirements, it can still lack transparency by, for instance,
hiding fees through "loopholes that hinder effective disclosure."93
Finally, some loans may require borrowers to "waive meaningful
legal redress" by agreeing to mandatory arbitration or waiving class-
action rights.94
2. Federal and State Mortgage Market Regulations
Against this backdrop of prime, subprime, and predatory loans,
federal and state mortgage regulations tried-and largely failed-to
protect consumers from the abusive lending practices that fueled the
mortgage crisis." Consumer protection laws focused on home-loan
origination can be broadly categorized into two groups: (1)
disclosure requirements, and (2) substantive regulation of loan
terms.96
a. Disclosure requirements
On the federal level, disclosure-requirement regulations are
codified under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)" and the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)." Enacted in 1968,99 TILA
seeks "to assure [the] meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit."'00
92. Id. at 1267-68 ("The most notorious deceptions include fraudulent disclosures, failures
to disclose information as required by law, bait-and-switch tactics, and loans made in collusion
with home-repair scams.").
93. Id at 1268-70 (noting that these exceptions include, for example, "fees for credit
reports, appraisals, inspections by lenders, flood certifications, document preparation, title
searches, and title insurance, as well as notary fees, recording fees, and government taxes").
94. Id. at 1260, 1270.
95. See Azmy, supra note 76, at 345; Fogel, supra note 30, at 436; Willis, supra note 79, at
714.
96. Cox, supra note 16, at 283.
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006).
98. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2006).
99. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
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TILA's primary mechanism requires that mortgage interest rates and
costs be expressed as an annual percentage rate (APR) term."o'
In 1974, Congress passed RESPA to supplement TILA.'02
RESPA aims to prevent excessive costs and unfair practices in
mortgage closings."o3 RESPA's primary disclosure mechanism is the
good faith estimate (GFE), which must be provided by lenders and
mortgage brokers within three days of a borrower's submission of a
mortgage application.1" The GFE is intended to inform borrowers of
"the nature and costs of real estate services."'
However, disclosure regimes like TILA and RESPA are often
criticized as being ineffective because they fail to educate consumers
and ignore the substantive terms of mortgage lending.10 6 Moreover,
as the severity of the mortgage crisis demonstrates, these disclosure
regimes did not successfully regulate the mortgage market.
b. Substantive regulation of loan terms
Substantive regulation of mortgage terms occurs at both the
federal and state levels.' At the federal level, the 1994 Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)os was a response to
predatory lending and was intended to protect vulnerable subprime
borrowers through both additional disclosure requirements and
substantive protections from abusive loan terms.0 ' On the
substantive side, HOEPA "designates a special class of nonpurchase,
closed-end 'high-cost' loans and prohibits lenders originating them
101. Jeffrey A. Payne, Class Retreat from Mass Deceit: Assessing Class-Action Compatibility
with Truth in Lending Act Rescission, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (2010); Willis, supra
note 79, at 744.
102. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724
(1974) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2601-2617 (2006)); Willis, supra note 79, at 744.
103. See Willis, supra note 79, at 744.
104. See id. at 745.
105. Peterson, supra note 81, at 2226. The GFE must be provided by lenders and mortgage
brokers within three days of a borrower's submission of a mortgage application. 24 C.F.R.
§ 3500.7 (2010).
106. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 79, at 749-54, 789-96 ("Even if all borrowers met the
mildly bounded decisionmaker model envisioned by the law, price shopping for home loans
would be extremely difficult in the subprime marketplace because the timing of the disclosures is
late, the information given is incomplete, and borrowers lack the financial literacy needed to use
the information provided.").
107. See Cox, supra note 16, at 285-86.
108. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639-1648 (2006)).
109. Willis, supra note 79, at 746-47.
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from employing specific loan terms or practices.""o Following the
enactment of HOEPA, states also began to combat predatory lending
through their own substantive restrictions on abusive loan terms.''
These laws are commonly referred to as "mini-HOEPAs."ll 2
Beginning with North Carolina in 1999, nearly thirty states have
enacted mini-HOEPAs."' Because these schemes vary greatly from
state to state, their impact on restricting predatory lending is
inconsistent and is best evaluated on the state level."14
Like the federal disclosure regimes, however, statutes regulating
the substantive terms of mortgages failed to protect consumers from
lending abuses. While some states' mini-HOEPAs proved effective
at limiting the severity of the mortgage crisis on a local level,"' they
generally fell short. Rather, the complexity of modem mortgage
products and the frequency with which the market changes"' allows
lenders to comply with HOEPA and mini-HOEPA laws while still
crafting abusive predatory loans."'
C. Fremont Investment & Loan Shows How the
Broad Unfairness Standard Makes UDAPs an
Effective Alternative Through Which to
Regulate the Mortgage Market
Fremont Investment & Loan demonstrates how the flexible
UDAP unfairness standard can successfully be applied to loans that
110. Azmy, supra note 76, at 352-53 ("HOEPA protections apply if a loan meets one of two
high-cost loan triggers: (i) the APR exceeds by eight percent the yield on Treasury securities of
comparable maturity for first-lien loans, or above ten percent for subordinate lien loans . . .; or
(ii) the total of all the loan's points and fees exceeds eight percent of the loan total or $400
(adjusted for inflation), whichever is greater."). In 2009, the Federal Reserve Board implemented
new regulations strengthening HOEPA. See Alan H. Schemer, State Subprime Lending Litigation
and Federal Preemption: Toward a National Standard, 30 PACE L. REV. 253, 263-65 (2009).
111. See Azmy, supra note 76, at 364-72.
112. See RAPHAEL W. BOSTIC ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV.,
THE IMPACT OF STATE ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAWS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND INSIGHTS
1 (2008).
113. See Azmy, supra note 76, at 361-62.
114. See BOSTIC ET AL., supra note 112, at 1. See generally Azmy, supra note 76, at 361-62
(surveying and critiquing mini-HOEPAs).
115. See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 76, at 361-62.
116. For example, subprime lending and the securitization of mortgages are relatively recent
phenomena. See, e.g., Sally Pittman, ARMS, But No Legs to Stand On: "Subprime" Solutions
Plague the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1089, 1097-98 (2008).
117. See, e.g., Fogel, supra note 30, at 454-59.
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do not violate TILA, RESPA, HOEPA, or mini-HOEPAs despite
being highly abusive and predatory. Because it made aggressive use
of the securities market to sell its loans, Fremont was largely
insulated from exposure to borrower default."' Consequently, the
company's lending standards changed to reflect that reality, and the
company began aggressively marketing its loans to unqualified
homebuyers. Some examples of the company's sales tactics included
the following: "roll[ing] out special offers to people with poor credit
ratings"; "target[ing] expensive housing markets, such as California,
Massachusetts, and New York, because mortgages there generated
larger commissions for the brokers"; and using brokers that were
"lazy, uneducated, or inexperienced" to sell stated-income loans in
low-income neighborhoods."'
These lax lending standards were used to sell loans to
unqualified borrowers:
One such borrower was Patricia Sujballi, who in May 2006
purchased a two-family home in Dorchester. Fremont gave
her a subprime loan for $529,000, even though she had just
moved out of a homeless shelter, was unemployed, and her
husband earned around $32,000 a year. . . . Sujballi's home
was foreclosed on June 15[, 2007], and on Tuesday, the
mother of two received a 72-hour notice to move out.
Sujballi said she faces being homeless again. [The
Massachusetts Attorney General's] action against Fremont,
she said, "is too late for me."1 20
Although Fremont's loans complied with disclosure regimes and
federal and state statutes that substantively regulate high-cost loan
terms, the trial court in Fremont Investment & Loan still found that
118. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 551-52 & n.6 (Mass. 2008).
For example, in July 2007, Fremont owned only 290 loans out of the roughly 3,000 Fremont-
originated Massachusetts loans still in existence. Id. at 551 & n.6; see also Brief of
Commonwealth, supra note 1, at 6 ("Although Fremont typically sold the vast majority of its
loans to the secondary market, Fremont continued to service many of the loans it originated, that
is, Fremont collected monthly payments and otherwise administered the loans."). However,
Fremont continued to service, but no longer own, nearly 2,200 of these loans. Fremont Inv. &
Loan, 897 N.E.2d at 551 & n.6.
119. Blanton, supra note 9.
120. Kimberly Blanton, 2,200 to Get Reprieves on Foreclosures: Facing Threat of a Suit,
Subprime Lender to Let State Review Mortgages, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 2007, at Dl.
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many of the loans were unfair under the Massachusetts UDAP.'21
Specifically, the court found that the combination of four loan
characteristics made these loans destined to fail from the moment of
origination:
1. The loan is an [adjustable-rate mortgage] with an
introductory period of three years or less; 2. The loan has an
introductory or teaser rate for the initial period that is at
least 3 percent lower than the fully indexed rate; 3. The
borrower has a debt-to-income ratio that would have
exceeded 50 percent if the lender's underwriters had
measured the debt, not by the debt due under the teaser rate,
but by the debt due under the fully indexed rate; and 4. The
loan-to-value ratio is 100 percent or the loan carries a
substantial prepayment penalty or a prepayment penalty
that extends beyond the introductory period.122
Notably, the court concluded that Massachusetts's mini-HOEPA
dictated this result.' Although Fremont's lending practices did
not violate the letter of the law, they fell "within the 'penumbra'
of [the mini-HOEPA's] concept of unfairness" because the
mini-HOEPA treated "a high cost mortgage loan . . . as
structurally unfair . . . if the lender reasonably believed at the
time the loan was issued that the borrower would be unable to
make the scheduled payments." 24
III. UDAPs FAILED TO RESTRICT THE PREDATORY
LENDING THAT CAUSED THE U.S. MORTGAGE CRISIS
As demonstrated by Fremont Investment & Loan,125 UDAPs
protect against mortgage abuses in a way that consumer protection
statutes like disclosure regimes and substantive term restrictions
cannot. Unlike RESPA, TILA, HOEPA, and mini-HOEPAs, the
UDAP "unfairness" standard goes beyond mere statutory compliance
to evaluate the substantive terms and procedural process of a
121. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BLSI, 2008 WL 517279, at *9-
16 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008).
122. Id. at *11.
123. Id. at*10-11.
124. Id.at*11.
125. 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008).
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mortgage practice on a flexible and more individualized basis.126
Nonetheless, the explosion of predatory lending and the subsequent
financial crisis indicate that UDAPs also failed to protect consumers
from mortgage-market abuses.' 27 Despite suffering injury from the
unfair practices of their competitors, other businesses in the
mortgage market largely lacked standing to initiate UDAP litigation.
A. Public Law Offices and Individual Consumers Were Not
Sufficiently Successful as UDAP Plaintiffs to
Effectively Deter Predatory Lending
When compared to the scope of lending abuses committed
during the housing bubble,'2 8 UDAP litigation, as evidenced through
available precedent, was relatively sparse.'2 9 Although there are some
examples of the successful use of UDAPs to combat predatory
lending, a survey of the available record suggests that UDAPs, as
currently structured, do not effectively protect consumers. Rather,
despite access to these powerful consumer protection laws, public
126. See generally Cox, supra note 16, at 283-86 (explaining how UDAPs differ from
objective disclosure requirements and substantive restrictions on loan terms because the analysis
is subjective); Fogel, supra note 30, at 454-56 (arguing that, in addition to the flexible unfairness
standard, UDAPs are an important alternative to anti-predatory lending regulations because they
usually provide for a private rights of action, a longer statute of limitations, and attorney's fees).
127. See supra Part II.B.
128. Back in 2001, when the housing bubble was in its infancy, predatory lending was
estimated to cost U.S. borrowers $9.1 billion annually. See ERIC STEIN, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF PREDATORY LENDING 2 (2001),
www.selegal.org/Cost%20of/ 20Predatory%20Lending.pdf This was before the subprime
mortgage market ballooned from less than 10 percent of new mortgage originations to nearly a
quarter. See Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home
Foreclosures: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th
Cong. (2007) (testimony of Martin Eakes, CEO, Ctr. for Responsible Lending), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStoreid=9e054bbl-
667c-4b47-888b-bbdd795346dl; SONIA GARRISON ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
CONTINUED DECAY AND SHAKY REPAIRS: THE STATE OF SUBPRIME LOANS TODAY 3 (2009),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/continued decayand
shakyrepairs.pdf.
129. For example, a search of two Westlaw databases that compile California verdicts,
judgments, and settlements reveals that since 2000 there are only seventy-seven such UCL
dispositions on record. See Westlaw, Search Results, http://www.westlaw.com (search VS-CA-JV
and LRPCA-JV databases for "(bus! /5 profl /5 1720* 1721*) & da(aft 1999)") (last searched
Mar. 17, 2010). Of these seventy-seven dispositions, only a single disposition references either
"mortgage" or "home loan." See Westlaw, Search Results, http://www.westlaw.com (search VS-
CA-JV and LRPCA-JV databases for "(mortgage "home loan") & (bus! /5 prop /5 1720* 1721*)
& da(aft 1999)") (last searched Mar. 17, 2010). That case, 1601 McCarthy Boulevard, LLC v.
GM4C Commercial Mortgage Corp., No. CGC-03-425848, 2005 WL 517619 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 26, 2005), involved a dispute over a commercial mortgage. Id at *2.
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law offices and individual plaintiffs appear to have not aggressively
prosecuted UDAP litigation until the dramatic rise in foreclosures
caught the nation's attention.
A few state attorneys general utilized UDAPs to combat
predatory lending before the mortgage crisis hit in 2007.' In 1998,
for example, several state attorneys general initiated UDAP litigation
against First Alliance Mortgage Company (FAMCO) that ultimately
led to a settlement of $525 million.'31 The abuses alleged in the
FAMCO matter foreshadow the predatory lending practices that
fueled the housing bubble. FAMCO was accused of originating-
often without borrower knowledge-"extraordinarily high cost loans
.. . , with fees regularly exceeding 20% of the principal amount,"
and "'teaser rate' adjustable rate mortgages that would increase at an
average of more than 2%, even if rates remained stable." 3 2
While, like Fremont, FAMCO ultimately filed for bankruptcy,
the settlement is significant because it "could [have] serve[d] as a
roadmap for the problems that lay ahead in the surging subprime
mortgage market."'33 However, there appear to be only a few other
examples of high-profile successful state attorney general UDAP
litigation against predatory lenders.'34 The point thus remains that
public law offices were not sufficiently successful at using UDAPs to
deter the predatory lending that caused the mortgage crisis.
As for private-party UDAP litigation, the record indicates that
while there were some individual success stories during the housing
bubble, private litigants did not pursue UDAP claims against
predatory lending en masse until after the mortgage crisis hit.
130. See generally Cox, supra note 16, at 293-297 (arguing that, "before the mortgage crisis
became apparent, "the only public agencies that systematically attempted to attack problems in
subprime mortgage lending were a few state attorneys general... who brought actions alleging
UDAP violations").
131. Id. at 293-95.
132. Id. at 294 (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 294-95.
134. See, e.g., id at 295-96 (discussing a 2004 to 2006 multi-state enforcement action against
Ameriquest Mortgage Corporation that resulted in a $325 million settlement); Gretchen
Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6 2008, at BI
(discussing a more recent multi-state enforcement action against Countrywide Financial). The
Countrywide matter was initiated in 2008 by California and Illinois after the mortgage crisis had
already arrived. See California Sues Countrywide over Lending, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2008, at
Cll. Within a few months, Countrywide settled with eleven states for $8.4 billion. Morgenson,
supra.
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California precedent offering insight into the types of predatory-
lending abuses targeted by UCL claims includes In re First Alliance
Mortgage Co. 135 and McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc.1'3 In First
Alliance, mortgagors of a bankrupt mortgage company brought class-
action claims against an investment bank, Lehman Brothers, Inc.,
alleging fraud and UCL violations for aiding and abetting the
mortgage company's predatory lending practices."' The lender, First
Alliance Mortgage Co., was accused of using deception to sell high-
cost mortgages to vulnerable borrowers who had "built up substantial
equity in their homes."'3 ' The plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on their
common-law fraud claim. 139
In McKell, another UCL class action, borrowers alleged that a
lender's mortgage practices were unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent.'40
The borrowers accused Washington Mutual, Inc. of "overcharging
plaintiffs for underwriting, tax services, and wire transfer fees in
conjunction with home loans." 4 ' After the trial court's dismissal of
the complaint on demurrer, the appellate court held that the plaintiffs
had successfully stated a claim for fraudulent and unfair business
practices in violation of the UCL.'42 Moreover, the plaintiffs'
unlawful-conduct claim under the UCL, borrowing from the
defendant's alleged violations of RESPA,'4 3 was not preempted.'44
135. 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).
136. 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 227 (Ct. App. 2006).
137. First Alliance, 471 F.3d at 983.
138. Id. at 984-85 ("First Alliance originated, sold and serviced residential mortgage loans in
the subprime market through a network of retail branches located throughout the country,
utilizing a marketing methodology designed to target individuals who had built up substantial
equity in their homes, many of whom were senior citizens. Through telemarketing efforts, First
Alliance employees would set up appointments for what they described as in-house appraisals
with targeted prospective borrowers. Following the appraisals, loan officers would employ a
standardized sales presentation to persuade borrowers to take out loans with high interest rates
and hidden high origination fees or 'points' and other 'junk' fees, of which the borrowers were
largely unaware. The key to the fraud was that loan officers would point to the 'amount financed'
and represent it as the 'loan amount,' disregarding other charges that increased the total amount
borne by the borrowers.").
139. Id at 1009-10. Despite satisfying the elements for a UCL violation, the appellate court
held that the UCL claim failed because the UCL's available remedies-injunctive relief and
restitution-could only be recovered from the lender, and not from Lehman Brothers on an aiding
and abetting theory. Id.
140. McKell, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 234.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 256.
143. Supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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Despite these success stories, relatively little UCL litigation
targeted predatory lending during the housing bubble. For example, a
search of California state and federal cases for UCL mortgage
litigation in the eight years between the beginning of 2000 and the
end of 2007 returns sixty-seven results-just over eight opinions per
year on average.14 5 Considering the scope of abuse and the depth of
the resulting crisis, it is apparent that private litigants were unable to
deter predatory-lending abuses during the housing bubble. Moreover,
the limited amount of litigation was almost entirely citizen-driven-
businesses did not initiate any mortgage-related UDAP litigation
alleging predatory lending practices.146
144. McKell, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 236.
145. See Westlaw, Search Results, http://www.westlaw.com (search CA-CS-ALL database
for "atleast5(mortgage) atleast5("home loan") & (bus! /5 prof' /5 1720* 1721*) & da(aft 1999 &
bef 2008)") (last searched Apr. 9, 2010) (showing eighty-six results). In order to avoid irrelevant
hits, the search requires that a disposition mention either "mortgage" or "home loan" at least five
times. Of the eighty-six hits, nineteen do not directly involve mortgage issues. See In re Wells
Fargo Home Mortgage Overtime Pay Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Wells
Fargo Home Mortgage Overtime Pay Litig., No. MDL 06-1770 MHP, 2007 WL 3045995 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 18, 2007); Woo v. Home Loan Group, L.P., No. 07-CV-0202-H (POR), 2007 WL
6624925 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2007); FTC v. Optin Global, Inc., No. C05-1502 SC, 2005 WL
1027108 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2005); Barnett v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, No. C 03-00753 CRB,
2004 WL 1753400 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2004); People v. Beaumont Inv., Ltd., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429
(Ct. App. 2003); Cal. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hanover/Cal. Mgmt. & Accounting Ctr., Inc., 56 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 92 (Ct. App. 2007); Vargas v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. H030802, 2007 WL
4100158 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2007); Cal. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hanover/Cal. Mgmt. and
Accounting Ctr., Inc., No. G034968, 2006 WL 3096029 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2006); Cebular v.
Cooper Arms Homeowner Ass'n, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 666 (Ct. App. 2006); WFS Fin., Inc. v.
Superior Ct., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561 (Ct. App. 2006); Oakland v. Rice, No. B176390, 2005 WL
2882831 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2005); Wagh v. Metris Dir., Inc., No. A103161, 2005 WL
1253940 (Cal. Ct. App. May 27, 2005); Garcia v. Mortgage Inv. Corp., No. B175195, 2005 WL
714038 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2005); Shaw Indus., Inc. v. Superior Ct., No. B167878, 2003 WL
22995267 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2003); Nat'l Notary Ass'n v. U.S. Notary, No. D038278, 2002
WL 1265555 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 2002); Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d
145 (Ct. App. 2001); Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220 (Ct. App. 2001);
Schwartz v. Vista Intern. Corp., No. 822404-4, 2003 WL 1870370 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003).
146. See Westlaw, Search Results, http://www.westlaw.com (search CA-CS-ALL database
for "atleast5(mortgage) atleast5("home loan") & (bus! /5 proff /5 1720* 172 1*) & da(aft 1999 &
bef 2008)") (last searched Apr. 9, 2010) (showing eighty-six results). Of the eighty-six results,
there are ten business-to-business dispute dispositions, none of which involve a challenge to a
predatory lending practice. See Standfacts Credit Services, Inc. v. Experian Information
Solutions, Inc., 405 F.Supp.2d 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Family Home & Finance Ctr., Inc. v. Fed.
Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 461 F.Supp.2d 1188 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Calyx Techs., Inc. v. Ellie
Mae, Inc., No. C 04-1640 SI, 2005 WL 2036918 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Resource Lenders, Inc. v.
Source Solutions, Inc., 404 F.Supp.2d 1232 (E.D. Cal. 2005); Golden West Financial v. WMA
Mortgage Services, No. C 02-05727 CRB, 2003 WL 1343019 (N.D. Cal. 2003); PMI Mortgage
Ins. Co. v. American Int. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., No. C-02-1774 PJH, 2002 WL 32065867
(N.D. Cal. 2002); CTX Mortgage Co. v. Rodriguez, No. G036120, 2007 WL 512755 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007); Am. Interbanc Mortgage, LLC v. E-Lenders Report Card, Inc., No D042546, 2005
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After the mortgage crisis hit, there was a dramatic increase in
the amount of private-party UCL mortgage litigation. The number of
UCL cases quickly ballooned from roughly eight per year to well
over one hundred per year between 2008 and 20 10.147 Like the timing
issue at play in Fremont Investment & Loan, this substantial increase
in UCL mortgage litigation apparently resulted from the record
numbers of foreclosures and their associated individual and
collective harms. 14 8
In sum, this brief survey of UDAP mortgage precedent permits
three general conclusions: (1) despite a unique ability to combat
novel forms of predatory lending, there was not a substantial amount
of UDAP litigation between 2000 and 2008; (2) public law offices
and individual consumers typically act in a reactionary fashion,
generally litigating only when past harms manifest themselves in a
more direct way; and (3) businesses in the mortgage industry did not
pursue UDAP litigation against predatory lending.
B. Businesses in the Mortgage Market Were Harmed by the
Bad Practices of Their Competitors
In addition to inflicting direct harm on consumers, predatory
lending imposes a significant secondary harm on honest businesses
in the mortgage industry by reducing their capacity to compete.
Lenders, appraisers, and mortgage brokers who did not engage in
unfair or deceptive practices were placed at a competitive
disadvantage in attracting market share vis-i-vis those firms that did
engage in predatory lending.
WL 615838 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Am. Interbanc Mortgage, LLC v. Bankrate, Inc., Nos.
G032166, G032344, 2004 WL 1922508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); CBSK Fin. Group, Inc. v. Novastar
Mortgage, Inc., No. B173210, 2004 WL 2757200 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
147. Using the same search terms but different years, a search of UCL state and federal
precedent from 2008 to 2010 returns 224 results. Westlaw, Search Results,
http://www.westlaw.com (search CA-CS-ALL database for "atleast5(mortgage) atleast5("home
loan") & (bus! /5 prof! /5 1720* 1721*) & da(aft 2007 & bef 2010)") (last searched Apr. 9,
2010).
148. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 18, at 19-20
(noting that four states-California, Arizona, Nevada, and Florida-accounted for "a stunning 61
percent of the growth in foreclosures nationwide.")
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1. Lenders
Predatory lending by unscrupulous firms harmed other lenders
by depriving them of the ability to issue fair mortgages with
competitive interest rates to borrowers purchasing affordable homes
at sustainable prices. Substantively unfair predatory lending through
subprime and Alt-A mortgages'49 like those at issue in Fremont
resulted in attractive but ultimately overpriced mortgages-loans that
were doomed to fail."'o By allowing consumers to borrow more,"'
predatory lenders lured borrowers away from competitor lenders that
refused to match the substantively unfair terms. Such schemes
ultimately led to higher interest rates, loss of borrower equity
extracted through frequent refinancing, and-eventually-
foreclosure.152
These predatory lenders also fueled the housing bubble by
putting borrowers in homes that they simply could not afford."'
While some borrowers were unable to afford a residential property at
any price level, the more likely result was that otherwise
creditworthy borrowers were continually lured into homes outside of
their price range. By originating unsustainable and unfair loans on
overvalued homes, predatory lenders like Fremont also harmed
competitors who could otherwise have profited by selling fair
mortgages at uninflated prices.
2. Appraisers
Another example of harm to market competitors involves
appraisal inflation, an example of procedurally unfair predatory
lending. A home appraiser overvaluing a property allows a borrower
to borrow more and a lender to lend more, thereby allowing a
mortgage broker to make a larger commission.'54 Because appraisers
generally develop local expertise and operate within a limited
geographic area, they are only in direct competition with a finite
149. Supra note 76 and accompanying text.
150. See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 552-54 (Mass. 2008).
151. See id at 552-53.
152. See Azmy, supra note 76, at 335-37.
153. See Brief of Commonwealth, supra note 1, at 9-14.
154. See J. Kevin Murray, Issues in Appraisal Regulation: A Crack in the Foundation of the
Mortgage Lending Process, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1301, 1314 (2010).
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number of other appraisers."' This competition is enhanced by the
structure of the appraisal process, which tacitly incentivizes
mortgage brokers and lenders to work exclusively with appraisers
that deliver desirable appraisals, regardless of accuracy."'
During the housing bubble, brokers and lenders funneled work
to appraisers who were willing to inflate their appraisals and away
from appraisers who refused to engage in this unfair conduct."'
Again, while ultimately imposing direct harms on individual
consumers who bought or borrowed against overpriced homes, there
were clear secondary harms imposed on honest business actors.
When true property values were later revealed, borrowers ended up
underwater; when these borrowers faced foreclosure, investors ended
up with insufficient collateral on the loans. Honest appraisers could
have helped to prevent the bubble; instead, they lost business due to
the unfair or deceptive practices of their competitors.
3. Mortgage Brokers
In the mortgage-broker sub-industry, a popular technique for
profiting from unfair or deceptive trade practices has been the
lowballing of both GFEs of settlement costs and TILA estimates of
mortgage costs. Under this bait-and-switch scheme, mortgage
brokers give borrowers RESPA-mandated GFEs and TILA-mandated
disclosures containing artificially low closing costs and loan price
figures soon after the borrower has applied for the home loan."'
However, when the borrower arrives at the loan closing table, the
settlement costs and loan terms are greatly inflated compared to the
prior GFEs.159 By then it is often too late for borrowers to pull out
155. See id. at 1315.
156. Although paid by borrowers, appraisers are selected by mortgage brokers or lenders. Id
at 1316. These brokers or lenders are in turn paid only when a mortgage application results in the
origination of a home loan. See id at 1314.
157. See id at 1313. The effects of this unfair practice were magnified by the localized nature
of the appraisal industry. See id. at 1315.
158. See Testimony of Patricia McCoy, Federal Reserve Board, Building Sustainable
Homeownership: Responsible Lending and Informed Consumer Choice Public Meeting 155 (June
7, 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/hoepa/2006/2006071 1/transcript.
pdf.
159. See id ("[T]he prices on subprime loans often turned out to be a moving target. A lender
or broker might have the customer apply for one type of loan, price A, say a fixed rate loan;
changed the loan during underwriting to an adjustable rate mortgage, price B; and then finally
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because of the inflexible timeline associated with the purchase of a
home or because the borrower has already committed the home's
equity through a refinance.' Other borrowers, having already looked
at the estimates to ensure that the closing costs and loan terms were
reasonable, simply do not realize that the operative terms of the
agreement have changed.
Bait-and-switch tactics with GFEs and TILA disclosures trick
borrowers into accepting unfavorable loan terms and deprive them of
the opportunity to search for mortgage brokers who present accurate
estimates of costs.'"' Because brokers are often paid in the form of
commissions for originated loans, brokers using bait-and-switch
techniques benefit from presenting unrealistically low costs to lure
borrowers away from brokers offering estimates with higher but
more accurate closing costs. Again, while the borrower suffers a
direct harm through fraudulent higher costs, honest brokers suffer an
indirect harm from a diminished capacity to compete with other
brokers who employ the lowball technique.
C. UDAPs Limit Standing for Market Competitors
Businesses did not pursue UDAP litigation against other
mortgage-market actors largely because UDAPs limit or omit
standing for these parties. Because the U.S. Constitution does not set
forth a standing requirement for state courts,'62 state legislatures have
discretion-within the limits of their state constitutions'"-to tailor
standing requirements to the policy considerations behind specific
statutory causes of action." Standing to sue in state court on a
change the loan at closing to something different at price C, say an interest only mortgage. Often,
the effect is bait and switch.").
160. See Willis, supra note 79, at 749-50.
161. See id. (citing a study that found that nearly 85 percent of borrowers end up with closing
costs higher than those quoted in their GFEs).
162. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy"
Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REv. 263, 263-64
(1990).
163. While state courts are not bound by the Article III standing doctrine, Asarco Inc. v.
Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989), some states have elected to impose similar constitutional
constraints. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues ": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1834-42, 1852-59 (2001).
164. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 367 (West 2010) (showing an example of statutory
enactment of a standing provision of general applicability); see also Hershkoff, supra note 163, at
1834-42, 1852-59 ("The source of standing rules varies from state to state, as does their
content."); Sullenger, supra note 20, at 488 ("When a statute creates a cause of action and
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UDAP theory is thus dictated by two related authorities: (1) the
background standing doctrine in that state's courts, whether
predicated on the state's constitution or a standing statute of general
applicability; and (2) any standing provisions in the state UDAP
itself. Federal standing law is largely irrelevant to the UDAP-
standing calculus because a UDAP plaintiff seeking a more relaxed
standing provision can pursue the claim in state court.'
1. UDAP Business-Standing Provisions
With respect to business plaintiffs, UDAP standing provisions
generally fall within one of five categories: (1) no private right of
action; (2) a private right of action for persons but not businesses; (3)
a private right of action for consumers, including businesses when
businesses act as consumers;' (4) a private right of action for
persons and businesses; and (5) a private right of action for persons
and businesses with no injury-in-fact requirement.167 States in the
first two categories deny UDAP standing to businesses altogether."'
States in the third and fourth categories confer businesses with
UDAP standing but impose a threshold injury-in-fact requirement
that significantly restricts the businesses' ability to exercise this
right.169 These restrictions reduce the deterrent effect of UDAPs by
largely eliminating businesses as potential UDAP plaintiffs.170 No
designates who may bring an action, the issue of standing is interwoven with that of subject
matter jurisdiction." (quoting Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn. 2004))).
165. See Catherine L. Rivard, Federal Court Standing in Unfair Competition Law Litigation,
24 L.A. LAW. 16, 17 (Mar. 2001). If a state UDAP claim is removed to federal court, it would
have to be remanded back to state court if the plaintiff does not satisfy federal standing
requirements. Id. at 16. Moreover, a state-court UDAP plaintiff can still pursue related federal
claims despite lacking independent federal-court standing. See Fletcher, supra note 162, at 303.
166. Businesses act like individual consumers only when they buy goods and services from
other businesses. See, e.g., Flynn & Slater, supra note 15, at 84, 87-88.
167. See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 2.4.5, at 89-96, § 7.2.1, at 659-60,
§§ 7.5.2.1-7.5.2.3, at 673-76 (describing the different limitations imposed on businesses as
potential UDAP plaintiffs); Flynn & Slater, supra note 15, at 87-93 (categorizing UDAP
approaches to business standing on a state-by-state basis); Toward Greater Equality, supra note
15, at 1634-40 (surveying UDAP business-standing restrictions nationally, and arguing that states
should extend UDAP coverage to include small businesses).
168. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, §§ 7.2.1-7.2.3, at 659-61. States in the second
category limit private-party UDAP standing to non-business individual consumers. See Toward
Greater Equality, supra note 15, at 1625.
169. See infra Part III.C.2.c.
170. See infra Part IV.
[Vol. 43: 12511278
GOOD COP, BAD COP
state currently employs the liberal UDAP standing found in category
five-representative standing."'
2. The Evolution of Standing Under the UCL
The story of UDAP standing in California illustrates the
significance of the categorical distinctions between different UDAP
business-standing provisions. Because California's constitution is
silent on the issue of standing,172 the state legislature elected to enact
a standing provision of general applicability: "Every action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as
otherwise provided by statute."
a. Pre-Proposition 64 UCL standing
Prior to 2004, the California legislature made just such a
statutory standing exception for the UCL. 7 4 Rather than require a
real party in interest, the UCL provided private-party plaintiff
standing for "any board, officer, person, corporation or association or
by any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the
general public.""' Generally referred to as "representative" or
"private attorney general" standing, this type of relaxed standing
provision allowed any party to bring a UCL claim in state court on
behalf of the general public.'7 1 In particular, representative standing
171. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 7.5.2.3, at 675-76; STERN, supra note 31, at
ch. 7-A.
172. See CAL. CONST. art. 1II, § 6.
173. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 367 (West 2010).
174. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 et seq. (West 2004); see also STERN, supra note
31, at ch. 2-D (reviewing the various legislative amendments to the UCL from 1933 to 2004).
175. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17535 (West 2004) (amended 2004); Fellmeth, supra note
23, at 1 ("[T]he [UCLI provides that any person who files is a party allowed to represent the
injunctive/restitutionary interests of all who may be injured-historically or prospectively."). In
2004 the statute was amended when voters passed Proposition 64 to read, in relevant part, as
follows:
Actions . . . under this section may be prosecuted by the Attorney General or any
district attorney, county counsel, city attorney, or city prosecutor in this state in the
name of the people of the State of California upon their own complaint or upon the
complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation or association or by any person
who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of a violation
of this chapter.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17535 (West 2004).
176. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 7-A. One commentator labeled the UCL's former
representative-standing provision as the "nonclass class" because "literally anyone can sue and
seek restitution on behalf of the public without having to meet the standards of a true class
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did not require a "transactional nexus" between the plaintiffs harm
and the wrongful conduct at issue."' Rather, a plaintiff could be a
"complete stranger to the transaction."7
With no restrictions on standing, the pre-2004 UCL empowered
business competitors to pursue UCL claims against other businesses
guilty of "unlawful," "unfair," or "fraudulent" conduct. 179  For
example, in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular
Telephone Co.,' a maker of mobile phones brought suit against a
mobile-phone service provider alleging that the service provider's
below-cost sale of mobile phones constituted unfair competition.'"'
While the opinion focused on defining the type of conduct that
violates the UCL unfairness standard in the context of a competitor
suit,'82 the facts illustrate how representative UCL standing facilitated
business-competitor litigation. Because the parties were not doing
business together, it would have been difficult for the plaintiff to
show an injury-in-fact from a transactional nexus to the defendant's
conduct. Instead, representative standing allowed the plaintiff to sue
for injury in the form of a diminished capacity to compete.'83
While there is some UCL business-competitor precedent,184 the
overall body of UCL law is relatively thin. This partly results from a
action." Id. at ch. 7-B. Another commentator facetiously remarked that "[a]ll [§ 17200] seems to
require is that the plaintiff actually be standing." Eliot G. Disner & Noah E. Jussim, So Unfair
and Foul: The Scandals Involving the Unscrupulous Application of the Private Attorney General
Provision of the Unfair Competition Act Cry Out for a Sensible Solution, 26 L.A. LAW. 42, 44
(Nov. 2003).
177. See STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 7-A. This differs from Article III standing limitations,
which require that the plaintiff be injured by the defendant's violation of the law. See generally
Brian Stem, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal "Case or Controversy" Requirement on
State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 77, 80-83 (1994) (describing Article III standing requirements).
178. STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 7-A.
179. See Christopher W. Arledge, Standing Under the Unfair Competition Law Is Unlikely to
Exist for Competitors, 50 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 51, 51-52 (Sept. 2008); STERN, supra note 31,
at ch. 7-A.
180. Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527 (Cal. 1999).
181. Id at 532-33.
182. See id at 532-34.
183. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. UIPS, 856 F. Supp. 538, 540 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
a business competitor lacked Article III federal-court standing to pursue a representative UCL
claim).
184. See, e.g., Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief such as restitution but could not
recover punitive damages); Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.2d 937 (Cal. 2003)
(concluding that disgorgement of profits is not a proper remedy in an individual action under the
UCL); AICCO, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 45 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2001) (holding that insurance
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general lack of published UDAP opinions because few UDAP
matters proceed to trial.' However, the universe of UCL remedial
options also significantly restricted representative competitor UCL
claims.'86 Because UCL claims are limited to equitable relief, only
the most aggrieved businesses-those suffering a significant
financial loss from a competitor's unlawful conduct-were
motivated to bring suit to secure injunctive relief and restitution.
Financially successful businesses were not motivated to risk costly
litigation by filing suit under the UCL where the potential for
monetary recovery was limited to recovery of attorney's fees. The
UCL therefore tempered broad representative standing with limited
remedial provisions that served to disincentivize such litigation.'
b. Proposition 64
Long disfavored by some in the state's business community, the
UCL's broad standing provision faced intense criticism after a series
of scandals emerged in which plaintiffs' attorneys were accused of
subverting the statute's purpose. These attorneys sued small
businesses under the UCL and entered into cash settlements for
personal gain; they neither enjoined the alleged unlawful, unfair, or
fraudulent practices nor made any serious attempts to compensate
injured consumers or entities.'" The uproar caused by these scandals
provided UCL opponents with an opportunity to limit the scope of
the law by eliminating the representative standing provision.189
companies had standing to sue industry competitors for violation of the UCL and were not
required to allege anti-competitive conduct); Saunders v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (overturning the superior court's dismissal on demurrer of a certified shorthand
reporter's suit against industry competitors alleging unfair business practices); Allied Grape
Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a grape
crusher's practices toward a cooperative of grape growers violated the UCL).
185. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 3.4.3.1, at 134; see also supra Part III.A
(surveying UCL mortgage precedent).
186. See Arkin, supra note 44, at 164-65.
187. See id.
188. See, e.g., Disner & Jussim, supra note 176, at 42-44 (describing the fallout from the
California Attorney General's 2004 investigations into two law firms for ethical violations
associated with "egregious and excessive enforcement" the UCL). But see Jacquetta Lannan,
Comment, Saving 17200: An Analysis ofProposition 64, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 451, 460-61
(2006) (arguing that, despite these examples of UCL facilitated ethics violations, "[t]he lawyers in
those cases filed actions that theoretically were legally sound").
189. See id. at 468 ("The tort reformers began a powerful campaign, backed in part by small
businesses. The largest contributors to the campaign, however, were large corporations who had
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On November 2, 2004, California voters passed Proposition
64.190 The proposition amended the UCL's standing provision by
requiring that private-party plaintiffs "ha[ve] suffered [an] injury in
fact and . .. lost money or property as a result of [the] unfair
competition."l9 ' Among its eight "Findings and Declarations of
Purpose," the Proposition stated that "[i]t is the intent of the
California voters in enacting this Act that only the California
Attorney General and local public officials be authorized to file and
prosecute actions on behalf of the general public."l92
c. Post-Proposition 64 UCL standing
Proposition 64 took immediate effect, eliminating representative
standing in UCL cases pending in both trial and appellate courts.193
Although the arguments advanced in favor of the initiative were
generally inapplicable to UCL business plaintiffs,19 4 the reform had a
significant impact on business-to-business UCL litigation.' Under
the post-Proposition 64 UCL standing provision, a business plaintiff
in California must demonstrate that as a result of the defendant's
previously been sued under the UCL. The money was poured into a televised campaign that
bombarded voters with stories of small business owners being bullied by unethical and
unscrupulous lawyers.").
190. Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's LLC, 138 P.3d 207 (Cal. 2006).
California Proposition 64 is now codified in scattered sections of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 17000 et seq. (West 2008).
191. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204; STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 2-D. Proposition 64
made other changes to the UCL scheme including, for example, a requirement that civil penalties
recovered by public law offices be used exclusively to further the enforcement of California
consumer protection laws. STERN, supra note 31, at ch. 2-D.
192. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 191, at 109. Other declarations included statements
that the UCL was "being misused by some private attorneys" to file "frivolous lawsuits-as a
means of generating attorneys' fees without creating a corresponding public benefit," and
"without any accountability to the public [or] adequate court supervision," and that "[fjrivolous
[UCLI lawsuits clog our courts and cost taxpayers ... California jobs and economic prosperity."
Id At the time, one commentator remarked that Proposition 64 was "an over-fix consisting of a
very bad public policy that will soon cause its own harm." Lannan, supra note 188, at 470
(alterations omitted).
193. See Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's LLC, 138 P.3d 207, 212-13 (Cal.
2006); see also Benjamin M. Weiss & Michael A. Geibelson, Life After 64: Two Cases Under
Review by the California Supreme Court Will Determine the Contours ofFuture Litigation Under
the UCL, 31 L.A. LAW 39, 40-44 (Sept. 2008) (discussing other issues left unresolved by
Proposition 64's amendments, including whether causation is now required and how substantial a
plaintiff's injury must be).
194. See infra Part IV.B.3.
195. See Arledge, supra note 179, at 55.
1282 [Vol. 43:1251
GOOD COP, BAD COP
unfair competition it suffered an injury-in-fact in the form of lost
money or property.' A business will usually only be able to satisfy
this standing requirement when there is a transactional nexus with
another business from the buying or selling of goods or services.'
Businesses seeking to sue competitors based on a diminished
capacity to compete are now denied standing under Proposition 64's
amendments.'"
In the context of the mortgage market, however, it is at least
plausible that a business could have post-Proposition 64 UCL
standing in a suit against a competitor, even in the absence of a clear
transactional nexus.'99 For example, if a plaintiff lender alleged that
another lender used unlawful or unfair practices to cause a borrower
to refinance one of the plaintiff lender's mortgages, the plaintiff
lender may be able to show an injury-in-fact-a loss of money-and
causation. Nonetheless, it is still safe to say that the post-Proposition
64 UCL generally prohibits business-competitor litigation.
California is hardly alone in precluding businesses from
pursuing UCL claims against competitors whose unlawful, unfair, or
fraudulent conduct harms both the business and the consuming
public.200 Most states provide businesses with UDAP standing only
when they can show an injury-in-fact.2 0 1 The remaining states do not
treat businesses as potential UDAP plaintiffs at all.202
196. Id at 54-55 (arguing that Proposition 64 imposes a standing requirement on UCL claims
that is more burdensome than Article III standing).
197. Arledge, supra note 179.
198. See id. at 55 ("The typical UCL action between competitors involves one competitor
suing the other for allegedly engaging in unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business activities, and
the plaintiff often alleges that it has lost business opportunities or profits as a result. Under the old
version of the UCL, such a plaintiff would probably not be able to seek restitution of the allegedly
lost profits . . . , such a plaintiff rarely will have had possession of or an ownership interest in the
lost profits sufficient to give rise to restitution-but the plaintiff would be able to seek injunctive
relief against the competitor. But after Proposition 64, even injunctive relief may be precluded.").
But see Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1151-53 (9th Cir. 2008)
(rejecting a UCL claim between business competitors on grounds unrelated to standing).
199. Of course, mortgage-market businesses continue to have UCL standing where there is a
clear transactional nexus with the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., CTX Mortgage Co v. Rodriguez,
No. G036120, 2007 WL 512755, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2007) (adjudicating a mortgage
lender's allegations of "a massive loan fraud land-flipping scheme" on statute of limitations
grounds).
200. See Arledge, supra note 179, at 55.
201. Flynn & Slater, supra note 15, at 87-93; Toward Greater Equality, supra note 15, at
1634-36. However, unlike California, several of these states further limit UDAP standing by
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IV. STATES SHOULD PROVIDE REPRESENTATIVE
UDAP STANDING FOR MARKET COMPETITORS
By now, it should be apparent that state UDAP business-
standing provisions are inconsistent and routinely fluctuate due to
legislative amendments or judicial reinterpretation.203 Under the
current UDAP business-standing approach, however, businesses
were legally ill-equipped to deter the unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent
predatory lending that permeated the home loan industry. Because
business competitors would make effective use of these strong and
flexible statutory devices to deter and combat abusive business
practices, they should be granted representative UDAP standing, an
amendment that would also benefit consumers by furthering the
public policy interests that underlie UDAPs.
A. State UDAP Statutes Should Be Amended to
Provide Broad Standing for Market Competitors
Whether through UDAP amendment or the enactment of a
distinct statutory scheme,2 0 states should provide the necessary legal
requiring a business to demonstrate a significant public interest in the litigation. See SHELDON &
CARTER, supra note 20, § 7.5.3, at 682-93.
202. See, e.g., Flynn & Slater, supra note 15, at 87-93.
203. See generally Arledge, supra note 179 (discussing the effect of Proposition 64 on
California's UCL); Edward X. Clinton, Jr., Business Standing Under the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act: An Attempt to Resolve the Confusion, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 71 (1996) (examining conflicting
judicial standards under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act); Cox,
supra note 38 (critiquing the private right of action under Minnesota consumer protection law
following an important judicial decision); Flynn & Slater, supra note 15, at 87-93 (analyzing the
ability of one business to sue another under state UDAP statutes); Sullenger, supra note 20
(arguing for business standing under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act); Charlotte E.
Thomas, The Quicksand of Private Actions Under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act:
Strict Liability, Treble Damages, and Six Years to Sue, 102 DICK. L. REV. I (1997) (arguing that
Pennsylvania courts have employed too liberal of an interpretation of that state's Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law); Toward Greater Equality, supra note 15 (surveying
state approaches to UDAP business standing).
204. A primary obstacle to this proposal is the legislative challenge associated with revising
UDAPs on a state-by-state basis. Some states have standing restrictions that would first require
constitutional amendment in order to permit UDAP standing reform. See Hershkoff, supra note
163, at 1852-59. Other state legislatures are free to tailor their UDAP standing restrictions as they
see fit. See id. In California, legislative reform of a voter-approved ballot proposition must be
consistent with the enacted proposition's language. See CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 10(c). If UCL
reform cannot be drafted in a manner authorized by Proposition 64, another voter-approved
measure would be necessary. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Board v. Cory, 145 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822 (Ct.
App. 1978); J. E. Macy, Annotation, Power of Legislative Body to Amend, Repeal, or Abrogate
Initiative or Referendum Measure, or to Enact Measure Defeated on Referendum, 33 A.L.R.2d
1118 (2009); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Initiative and Referendum § 52 (2009). While this would be a
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tools to empower market competitors to enjoin and deter unfair
business practices. This Article proposes the following four reforms:
(1) business competitors should have representative UDAP standing;
(2) representative standing should be tethered to a public-interest
requirement; (3) UDAP remedial provisions should be expanded for
business plaintiffs; and (4) settlements of competitor UDAP claims
should be public and require judicial approval.
1. Representative Market-Competitor UDAP Standing
As a first step, state UDAPs should provide standing for
businesses.205 Because businesses generally only suffer a conjectural
injury in the form of a diminished capacity to compete, most
businesses lack a transactional nexus with the wrongful conduct of
their business competitors. 206  As such, businesses usually lack
standing to pursue UDAP claims against other businesses.207 This
lack of standing unnecessarily handicaps a business's ability to
influence conduct in its marketplace through UDAP litigation.208
Therefore, if businesses are to enhance the deterrent effect of UDAPs
as additional potential plaintiffs, UDAP standing for businesses must
be representative in form-omitting the traditional injury-in-fact
requirement.209
Representative UDAP standing for businesses would enable
market competitors to use UDAPs to efficiently and effectively
daunting task, the California legislature could initiate the process by placing the proposal on the
ballot. See CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 10.
205. See supra Part III.C.I.
206. See supra Part III.C.2.c.
207. See supra Part III.C.2.c.
208. See infra Part IV.B.
209. See generally infra Part IV.C. 1; William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney
General" Is-And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2129 (2004) (discussing the legal concept
and various applications of representative standing). Presumably, the collective rationale behind
this proposal is also applicable to industry trade associations if such groups are viewed as a
collection of individual competitors. Because they also generally lack standing under the injury-
in-fact standard, see Standfacts Credit Servs. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., Nos. SA CV 04-
0358 DOC (PKWx), SA CV 04-1055 DOC (PJWx), 2006 WL 4941834, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(dismissing a trade association's post-Proposition 64 UCL claim for lack of standing), trade
associations represent an additional group that merits evaluation for the provision of
representative UDAP standing. In the context of the mortgage market, for example, trade
associations representing appraisers or mortgage brokers may have been more valuable as
potential UDAP plaintiffs than individual businesses because the fragmented nature of those two
sub-industries makes effective business-to-business litigation more problematic.
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police their own marketplaces.2 10 Nonetheless, representative UDAP
standing for market competitors should supplement, not replace,
traditional standing requirements. Rather, businesses should be able
to plead either injury-in-fact standing through a showing of a
transactional nexus, or representative standing through a showing of
a market-competition nexus. Requiring representative business
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are in actual competition with a
defendant would ensure that these business plaintiffs have a tangible
interest in the outcome of the litigation, which in turn would help
prevent the type of attorney's fees-driven litigation that led to the
passage of Proposition 64.211
2. A Public-Interest Requirement
To promote the consumer-protection purpose underlying
UDAPs and prevent businesses from abusing broad standing
provisions, UDAPs should require prospective market-competitor
plaintiffs to identify a public interest that their UDAP litigation
would advance.212 Under this scheme, business plaintiffs could gain
either traditional UDAP standing (by alleging an injury-in-fact) or
representative standing (by demonstrating a public interest in the
outcome of the litigation).
A public-interest requirement could be instrumental in
preventing businesses from abusing a liberal standing provision to
harm competitors. In the business-to-business litigation context, a
business can use litigation in many unscrupulous ways. For example,
a larger competitor could try to drive a smaller competitor out of
business with oppressive litigation costs. A business could also
utilize litigation to try to acquire a competitor's trade secrets through
discovery disclosures. Although a public-interest requirement would
210. See Flynn & Slater, supra note 15, at 97; see also infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing some of
the potential strengths of businesses as UDAP plaintiffs).
211. See supra Part III.C.2.b. To precisely define a "market competitor," legislatures may find
themselves evaluating the substantiality of competitive business relationships in countless
contexts and confronting difficult definitional questions (for example, whether the parties need to
be providing the same good or service, or whether they need only be in the same industry). As a
result, state legislatures may be better off articulating a balancing test-the potential benefits of
business-to-business UDAP litigation against the potential for abuse when the competitive
relationship is distant or de minimis-to guide the judiciary in building a workable definition
through case law.
212. See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 7.5.3, at 682-93 (reviewing the
various approaches to UDAP public-interest requirements).
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not completely eliminate the possibility of abuse, it would make
UDAP litigation more likely to benefit the broader community while
limiting its potential as a competitive tool for businesses.
Like the remedial limitations imposed by California's pre-
Proposition 64 UCL,213 a public-interest requirement would moderate
the potential costs of a broad business-standing provision. Some
jurisdictions already require businesses to demonstrate the promotion
of a public interest to obtain UDAP private-party standing;214
however, these jurisdictions impose this requirement in addition to
the threshold injury-in-fact standing requirement, not in its place.
This Article suggests that it is more appropriate to require a business
competitor to demonstrate an injury-in-fact for traditional standing in
ordinary business disputes and a public interest where a business
seeks to utilize representative standing.
However, courts must strike the right balance between gate-
keeping and facilitating self-regulatory UDAP competitor litigation.
Rather than enforcing standing requirements rigidly, courts should
approach the question of standing with flexibility and a broad view
of the substantive merits, purpose, and potential effects of the
litigation. 215 For example, a court could look to a variety of factors to
determine whether the requirement is satisfied: (1) the number of
consumers impacted by the abusive practice; (2) the magnitude of the
defendant's interaction with the public; (3) the sophistication and
bargaining power of the parties involved; (4) the harm, or lack
thereof, that the practice has caused in the past; (5) the likelihood
that the practice will recur; (6) the isolated or systematic character of
the practice; (7) the practice's violation of or compliance with
statutes promoting the public interest; and (8) the practice's relation
to a consumer transaction or a private dispute.2 16
213. See supra III.C.2.a.
214. See, e.g., Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 312-14 (Minn. 2000) (imposing a public-
interest requirement on all private-party plaintiffs under Minnesota's UDAP); Hall v. Walter, 969
P.2d 224, 234-36 (Colo. 1998) (finding that businesses have standing under Colorado's UDAP
only if they can show a significant public interest). As of 2004, eight states imposed a public-
interest requirement. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 7.5.3, at 682-93.
215. For example, Washington and Minnesota impose a burdensome public-interest
requirement that is difficult to satisfy. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, §§ 7.5.3.2-
7.5.3.3, at 685-88; Cox, supra note 38, at 163.
216. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 7.5.3, at 682-93.
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3. Remedies That Deter Unfair Business Practices
UDAP remedies available in competitor cases should deter
abusive business practices and incentivize self-regulatory UDAP
competitor litigation. Like standing provisions, remedies should take
into account the difference between the two types of potential
competitor plaintiffs: (1) businesses that have suffered an injury-in-
fact; and (2) those that have suffered a conjectural injury from a
diminished capacity to compete.
Presumably businesses that have suffered an injury-in-fact from
a competitor's wrongful conduct are primarily motivated to litigate
to enjoin the competitor's unfair practices. The potential recovery of
damages and attorney's fees would remain as secondary
considerations. Because such businesses have suffered an injury-in-
fact, a provision for bare compensatory damages would sufficiently
motivate and compensate these types of plaintiffs. If more remedial
flexibility is sought, jurisdictions could increase potential
compensation by making multiple or punitive damages available
where a defendant's conduct is particularly egregious or
intentional.217
By contrast, businesses that have been injured in the form of a
diminished capacity to compete in their marketplaces have different
motivations to litigate. Because these plaintiffs have not suffered a
legally recognized injury such that they are entitled to sue for
compensatory damages, their potential recovery is limited to
injunctive relief and attorney's fees. While enjoining a defendant's
wrongful conduct and potentially recovering for attorney's fees are
desirable remedies, the risk of loss from the costs of litigation-
coupled with the lack of a tangible impact on the company's bottom
line-would likely be sufficient to discourage such self-regulatory
UDAP litigation.
To limit these risks, it thus becomes necessary to pair
representative market-competitor UDAP standing with the potential
for a monetary recovery. Enhanced remedial provisions would
strengthen UDAPs by (1) reinforcing the overall deterrent effect of
217. Multiple or treble damage provisions permit or require a court to multiply an "actual
damage award, under specified conditions, . . . usually by three." They are available under
"[a]bout half of all UDAP statutes." SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 8.4.2, at 756-69.
Punitive damages are available to remedy UDAP violations in at least twelve states. Id. § 8.4.3.1,
at 769-70.
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the statutes, and (2) better incentivizing industry self-regulation
through UDAP litigation. Provisions for multiple or punitive
damages would be the best way to accomplish this result. However,
these statutory damage multipliers cannot exist in isolation; instead,
they must be tied to an existing monetary award. Because
representative market-competitor plaintiffs lack injuries meriting
compensatory damages by definition, another mechanism must
provide a baseline award upon which to build multiple or punitive
damages.
One way to create such a baseline monetary award is by creating
a statutory minimum-damages provision.2 18 Such a provision could
award a successful UDAP plaintiff either a fixed amount or an
amount within a specified range. However, the fixed damages option
is problematic in the context of UDAP litigation because potential
UDAP business plaintiffs and defendants range from small
businesses to the largest corporations. Fixed statutory minimum
damages would have to be set at a level that would be largely
ineffective at motivating or deterring large-business defendants so as
not to overburden small-business defendants.
This problem could be solved by awarding statutory minimum
damages as a percentage instead of a dollar amount.2 19 A fixed
percentage approach would tailor a UDAP's statutory minimum
damages to the size of the business by awarding a successful plaintiff
a proportion of the defendant's annual revenue rather than a fixed
amount or range. A more precise-and perhaps more appropriate-
approach would provide for a percentage recovery from the revenue
of the specific product or service line in which the abusive activity
has occurred rather than tying an award to the company's overall
revenue.
Under this scheme, traditional business UDAP plaintiffs with an
injury-in-fact could secure injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and
218. Minimum-damages provisions require a court to award a specified amount to a
successful plaintiff regardless of proof of actual damage. Id. at 754. They are designed to
"encourage private litigation" by increasing the incentive for plaintiffs to sue when their actual
damages are minor and by eliminating the need to prove actual damages. Id. at 754-55.
Approximately half of the states provide statutory minimum damages, which range from $25 to
$5,000 per violation, to private plaintiffs who prove a UDAP injury. Id. at 754.
219. See Payne, supra note 101, at 1216 & nn.35-37 (discussing how damages for violating




compensatory damages. If a defendant's conduct is particularly
egregious, a court could also award multiple or punitive damages. In
contrast, representative business UDAP plaintiffs could recover
injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and a statutory minimum damages
award tied to the defendant's revenue. If a defendant's conduct is
sufficiently egregious or intentional, multiple or punitive damages
awards would be available to enhance the statutory minimum
damages, thereby increasing the UDAP's deterrent effect while
creating an incentive for business competitors to act as litigant-
regulators.
4. Public Settlements
The potential for UDAP abuse by representative business
plaintiffs could also be limited by requiring that any settlement of
business-to-business UDAP litigation be both public in nature and
judicially approved.220 First, requiring judicial approval and public
knowledge of settlements in UDAP suits would help to ensure that
litigation actually benefits the public.22 ' Like the attorneys who
allegedly abused California's UCL to extort attorney's fees from
small businesses, representative business UDAP plaintiffs could
secure a financial windfall from a settlement with a competitor
without enjoining the defendant's harmful practices to create a public
benefit.222 Requiring judicially sanctioned settlements would ensure
that injunctive relief is issued to promote the public interest.223
Representative competitor UDAP standing could thus curb bad
business practices rather than serving as a vehicle for litigation
abuse.
220. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and
Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1457 (2006) (discussing the pros and cons of
secret settlement restrictions, including their effectiveness and their economic impact). While
jurisdictional approaches vary, public-settlement provisions generally seek to prevent secret
settlements by voiding confidentiality clauses in settlement contracts. Id at 1458-59, 1476.
Efforts to prohibit secrecy in litigation gained traction in the 1980s and 1990s after secret
settlements of individual mass-tort claims prevented others from learning of the potential for
harm or the existence of a claim. Id. at 1457-58 (discussing recent examples including the
Firestone/Bridgestone tires matter that contributed to at least 148 deaths, and widespread
allegations against the Catholic Church of sexual abuse by priests).
221. See Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement out of the Shadows: Information
About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REv. 663, 664-66, 701-07 (2001).
222. See Lannan, supra note 188, at 476-77 (arguing that Proposition 64 would have been
unnecessary if the UCL had required judicial approval of settlements).
223. Disner & Jussim, supra note 176, at 44.
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Second, a public-settlement requirement in business-to-business
UDAP litigation would prevent duplicative litigation against the
same defendant. A primary criticism of California's pre-Proposition
64 UCL was that different representative litigants could pursue
duplicative UCL actions, burdening defendants with multiple claims
stemming from the same conduct.224 Judicially sanctioned public
settlements would prevent this inequitable result in representative-
standing cases at least in part by creating a res judicata effect to
protect defendants from duplicative lawsuits.225
Criticism of public-settlement provisions as ineffective and
counterproductive generally presumes that both plaintiffs and
defendants share a financial interest in secret settlements.2 26 In the
context of representative business-to-business UDAP litigation,
however, it is less likely that a plaintiff and a defendant would share
this motivation. While a business plaintiff is motivated to maximize
its financial windfall and a business defendant is motivated to limit
its loss, a business plaintiff would also benefit in a more tangible
way than an individual plaintiff from the injunctive relief and
harmful publicity that could result from the judicial enforcement of a
public settlement.
B. Public Policy Supports the Provision ofRepresentative
UDAP Standing for Market Competitors
Conferring representative UDAP standing upon business
competitors would advance substantial public policy interests,
namely promoting industry self-regulation and discouraging a "race
to the bottom." Moreover, policy-based criticisms of general
224. See id. at 42-44; Lannan, supra note 188, at 462-63; see also SHELDON & CARTER,
supra note 20, § 7.2.1, at 659-60, § 7.7.8, at 719 (describing how duplicative UDAP claims can
be brought by both a private litigant and a public law office).
225. See FELLMETH, supra note 23, at 1-2 & nn.4-6. Other potential advantages of public
settlements in the context of representative business UDAP standing could include: (1) preventing
sellout settlements, whereby the plaintiff business elects to join the defendant business in the bad
activity; and (2) providing a greater opportunity for the media to publicize the settlement and
educate consumers about the specific practice at issue. See infra Part IV.B.2
226. See Drahozal & Hines, supra note 220, at 1459 (arguing that plaintiffs generally have a
significant financial interest in secret settlements because a defendant is incentivized to pay more
to an individual plaintiff, for example, in order to prevent other potential plaintiffs from
discovering the past conduct); cf Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Court Rules
Must Be Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REv. 883, 884-94 (2004). But see Scott A. Moss, Illuminating
Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 909-12
(2007).
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representative UDAP standing do not apply with equal force to
business-competitor litigation.
1. Empowering Industry Self-Regulation
From a broad policy perspective, it makes little sense to
authorize government and consumer UDAP litigation without also
providing business competitors with the legal tools to facilitate self-
regulation.227 Part of the original purpose of the UDAP private right
of action was to supplement the ineffectiveness and limited resources
of the government by expanding the pool of potential unfair business
practice regulators beyond the FTC to state public law offices and
private-party litigants.228 The provision of representative standing for
businesses is thus consistent with this general goal of enhancing the
overall effectiveness of consumer protection laws.229 Including
businesses in the pool of potential UDAP plaintiffs benefits both the
consuming public and the plaintiff-competitor by increasing the
number of UDAP enforcers, thereby enhancing the deterrent effect of
the statute.230
Moreover, the provision of representative UDAP standing for
market competitors fits with the basic socioeconomic principle that
government should only regulate where the industry at issue has first
failed to satisfactorily self-regulate.231 UDAPs currently provide state
public law offices and individual consumers with plenary authority
to redress unfair business activity,232 but deny industry actors an
opportunity to police their own marketplaces. 233 Not only is this
contrary to common sense, but it also ignores the benefits of
reducing strain on public law offices by partially reallocating the
227. See Flynn & Slater, supra note 15, at 97; Toward Greater Equality, supra note 15, at
1640.
228. Fogel, supra note 30, at 455-56.
229. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
230. Notably, this proposal also reconnects UDAPs with the common-law trademark claims
that provided the original framework for FTC and UDAP jurisprudence. See Howard, supra note
31, at 706-13. Ironically, these historical common-law claims only permitted litigation between
competitors and did not recognize standing for government or consumer claimants. See STERN,
supra note 31, at ch. 2-A.
231. See PRIDGEN, supra note 51, § 6.2 ("[T]he private right of action [is] a marketplace
solution to a marketplace problem.").
232. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 20, § 1.1, at 1.
233. See supra Part III.C.
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burden of UDAP enforcement to better incorporate private actors.234
Rather than handicapping businesses as potential UDAP plaintiffs,
the law should empower businesses to take more responsibility in
protecting both consumers and the integrity of their respective
industries.
2. Avoiding a Race to the Bottom
If businesses are not provided with the legal tools necessary to
combat unfair or unlawful conduct, market forces compel them to
keep pace with bad industry actors.235 For example, a business that is
unable to initiate UDAP litigation against a competitor's unfair
business activity risks going out of business if it fails to adjust its
own business practices to incorporate the profitable wrongful
conduct.236 Conversely, if market competitors are provided with
broad standing to combat wrongful conduct but fail to effectively use
these legal tools, society is more justified in holding an entire
industry accountable for the actions of individual entities.
There is at least some evidence that a race to the bottom among
mortgage businesses contributed to the growth of predatory lending.
In the context of the securitization market, competition from industry
actors helped drive Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into the subprime
market.237
Fannie and Freddie did eventually relax their standards and
get into the nonprime market, but they were motivated to do
so by the need to preserve market share.
Fannie and Freddie began entering the nonprime
market in 2005, after losing almost half of their market
share to private issuers of mortgage-backed securities. Their
decision to enter this market was a response to competitive
pressures from the investment banks .... 238
234. See, e.g., PRIDGEN, supra note 51, § 6.2.
235. FELLMETH, supra note 23, at 15-17.
236. See id.
237. BAKER, supra note 16, at 29-30 ("Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-created
companies established to promote a secondary mortgage market by buying mortgages from the
banks who issued them. Both were largely run as private companies prior to the crisis, and
continue[] to fill this public purpose . . .
238. Id.
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's unwise decision to enter the
subprime market is only one example of the competitive race to the
bottom that drove increasingly risky and more abusive business
practices during the housing bubble. Rather than having their hands
tied by their lack of UDAP standing, businesses should be
challenged to maintain lawful, fair, and competitive marketplaces.
3. Policy Arguments Advanced Against Representative UDAP
Standing Do Not Readily Apply to Market Competitors
Finally, the arguments in favor of the Proposition-64 UCL
reforms are not readily applicable to imposing standing restrictions
on businesses. Proposition 64 advocates argued that representative
standing led to "shake down" lawsuits without corresponding public
benefits.239 In such lawsuits, plaintiffs' attorneys were accused of
bringing meritless UDAP claims against small businesses solely to
extort settlement dollars.240
However, providing limited representative standing for market
competitors would not permit such manipulation of the system if
market-competitor plaintiffs were required to have a nexus with the
defendant's wrongful conduct as a competitor in the same industry.24 '
A nexus also creates a stronger connection between market-
competitor suits and a corresponding public benefit24 2-a connection
that is furthered by requiring that a representative standing business
plaintiff demonstrate a public interest in the outcome of the
litigation.24 3
239. Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 64 (2004); see also Disner & Jussim, supra note 176, at 43-45
("The profiteering by some lawyers using Section 17200 to file actions that were needless and
redundant because public enforcement agencies have already acted has highlighted other ethical
problems surrounding the Unfair Competition Act.").
240. Disner & Jussim, supra note 176, at 42.
241. A plaintiff that is a true business competitor-not just a plaintiffs' attorney-is invested
in gaining more than attorney's fees. See id at 42-46.
242. Businesses presumably want to enjoin the wrongful conduct and not just recover
damages and attorney's fees. Coupling this desire for injunctive relief with the deterrent effect of
damages awards would further restrict unfair conduct, creating an even greater public benefit.
243. See Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 234-37 (Colo. 1998); SHELDON & CARTER, supra
note 20, §§ 8.5-8.6, at 782-90.
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C. Market-Competitor UDAP Standing
Could Have Made a Difference
In addition to the aforementioned policy considerations, there
are practical benefits to market competitors functioning as UDAP
plaintiffs. These advantages place businesses in a strong position to
show a court how a novel or established business practice violates a
UDAP's unfairness standard. When balancing the competing
interests involved in this proposed expansion of UDAP standing, the
benefits outweigh the more limited potential costs of this reform.
1. Benefits of Representative Competitor Standing
UDAP schemes are less effective when market competitors are
denied representative standing because market competitors are
ideally positioned to promote fair business practices through UDAP
litigation. Compared to other potential plaintiffs with UDAP
standing-namely public law offices and individual consumers-
businesses have: (a) more marketplace expertise; (b) greater
permanence as industry stakeholders; and (c) more substantial
financial resources.
a. Marketplace expertise
Market competitors should have broad standing to pursue UDAP
claims against unscrupulous businesses because they have the
knowledge to identify-and advocate against-unfair business
practices. Unlike government attorneys and private plaintiffs, market
competitors are true experts in their respective industries and should
know what constitutes fair business activity in the marketplace.
Businesses are also better equipped to discover unfair competition
because they are industry insiders.2" Individual consumers, on the
244. Collectively referred to as "competitive intelligence," many small and large businesses
actively engage in gathering and analyzing intelligence information about their competitors'
products and customers. See Linda K. Stevens, Trade Secrets and Inevitable Disclosure, 36 TORT
& INS. L.J. 917, 940 (2001); Neil King Jr. & Jess Bravin, Call It Mission Impossible Inc.-
Corporate-Spying Firms Thrive, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2000, at B 1. Distinguishable from illegal
intelligence gathering or industrial espionage, competitive intelligence involves acquiring
information through legal means. Robert C. Van Arnam, Comment, Business War: Economic
Espionage in the United States and the European Union and the Need for Greater Trade Secret
Protection, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 95, 133 & n.262 (2001) (citation omitted); Paulette
Thomas, Breakaway (A Special Report): The Entreprenurial Life-Intelligent Intelligence:
Information on Rivals, Suppliers and Clients Can Keep a Business Alive; But Knowing What to
Look for and How to Look Is Vital, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1998, at 29.
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other hand, usually learn about an unfair business practice only after
they realize that they have been injured, and, even then, their
knowledge is limited to their own experiences. Public law offices are
similarly constrained because their own channels for the discovery of
bad business practices are often limited to individual consumer
complaints.24 5
Moreover, market competitors are more likely to stop practices
before they harm the broader public because they can identify abuse
sooner.246 These advantages are particularly pertinent in the context
of the flexible UDAP unfairness standard because an effective
advocate can further a UDAP's statutory purpose of adapting to and
enjoining novel forms of bad business practices.2 47
b. Competitors as marketplace stakeholders
Market competitors should be empowered to make effective use
of UDAPs because they are, at least theoretically, financially
245. See, e.g., Mass.Gov, Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation, Official Website of the
Office of Consumer Affairs & Business Regulation (OCABR), How to Resolve a Consumer
Problem, http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=ocamodulechunk&L=2&LO=Home&LI=Consumer&
sid=Eoca&b=terminalcontent&f-resolve_aproblem&csid=Eoca (last visited Aug. 18, 2010);
Andrew M. Cuomo, New York State Attorney General, Consumer Frauds Bureau, Filing a
Consumer Complaint, http://www.ag.ny.gov/bureaus/consumer-frauds/filing a_consumer
complaint.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). Because they are not experts in an industry,
individual consumers and public law offices generally have to educate themselves about the
particular market to better recognize questionable conduct. The average consumer's lack of
sufficient legal knowledge to understand that an unreasonable term in a contract may actually
constitute an unfair business practice is particularly relevant in the context of UDAP litigation.
246. See Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional
Perspective, 19 L. & POL. 363, 363 (1997) ("[T]here is growing evidence of a range of
circumstances where self-regulation (either alone, or more commonly, in conjunction with other
policy instruments) can be a remarkably effective and efficient means of social control."); Debra
A. Valentine, General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, Industry Self-Regulation and
Antitrust Enforcement: An Evolving Relationship, Remarks Before the Interdisciplinary Center
Herzlia, the Arison School of Business, and the Israeli Antitrust Authority Seminar on New
Developments in Antitrust Policy (May 24, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
other/dvisraelspeech.shtm (discussing ways in which the FTC has aided private-industry actors
with industry self-regulation).
247. Indeed, a primary criticism of UDAPs in general is that the unfairness standard is too
vague, such that compliance is overly burdensome. See, e.g., J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballan, New
Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 347, 348-49 (1992) (concluding that, despite some examples of novel
applications of UDAPs, courts are not "abusing their authority by interpreting [UDAPs] more
broadly than envisioned by the legislatures"); Thomas, supra note 203, at 32 (suggesting that,
with UDAPs, courts "must be cautious not to interpret away the legislature's written word").
However, bringing businesses to the table to help define the contours of unfair or deceptive
practices is one way to mitigate this criticism.
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invested in securing a vibrant marketplace in their respective
industries. While a UDAP's consumer-protection purpose appears to
conflict with a business's primary function in furthering its own
financial success, these seemingly divergent interests can both be
served by representative market-competitor standing. If a competitor
is operating in an unfair or deceptive fashion, a direct harm is
inflicted upon its customers; however, a significant, indirect harm
is also imposed on that business's competitors that have suffered
injury from a lost opportunity to compete. 249 As such, a market
competitor arguably has a greater incentive to bring UDAP litigation
because its viability depends on the health of the market in which it
participates; for consumers and public law offices, however, a
particular business's set of UDAP violations is only one among
many concerns.
c. Financial resources
Relative to individual consumers and taxpayer-funded state
public law offices, market competitors are well positioned to make
effective use of UDAPs because they collectively have the most
resources with which to litigate.250 While this proposition
undoubtedly varies by plaintiff and industry, businesses generally
have more resources to devote to litigation than do individuals.2 51
Because litigation poses significant financial risk, however, it is
important to mitigate this risk as much as possible through strong
remedial provisions-monetary remedies that would incentivize
industry self-regulation while deterring unfair business practices.252
2. Costs of Representative Competitor Standing
Despite the value added from employing businesses as
aggressive, self-regulatory UDAP litigants, expansion of UDAP
standing is not without cost. In the context of business-to-business
litigation, the primary drawbacks include indirect harms to
248. See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 15, at 1631-32.
249. Id.
250. See Lannan, supra note 188, at 476; Fogel, supra note 30, at 455-56.
251. Toward Greater Equality, supra note 15, at 1626 ("Unscrupulous merchants know that
federal and state government agencies can monitor and detect only a small fraction of the
deceptive or fraudulent practices occurring in the marketplace.").
252. See supra Part IV.A.3.
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consumers through a reduced access to credit and the potential for
litigation abuse.253
a. Indirect harm to consumers
Critics often argue that consumer protection laws actually hurt
the groups they seek to protect by reducing access to credit or driving
up prices.2 54 This argument is readily applicable to UDAP market-
competitor standing because increased litigation may drive up costs
for consumers and lead to new restrictions on business practices.255
Despite these theoretical costs to consumers, erring on the side of
broader consumer protection offers greater benefits than the
questionable extension of credit. After all, the liberal access to credit
in the years leading up to the mortgage crisis did not result in a
corresponding increase in homeownership rates. 256 It must therefore
be asked whether business practices that ultimately hurt consumers
are even worth protecting.257 Simply stated, some credit is not in
consumers' best interest, so not every extension of credit merits
protection.258
b. The potential for litigation abuse
Critics could also argue that representative UDAP market-
competitor standing would both revive the same abuses that led to
the passage of Proposition 64 and create entirely new opportunities
for abuse. 259 However, the requirements of (1) an actual business-
competitor plaintiff, (2) a demonstration of a significant public
253. Several articles have explored more general criticisms of UDAPs. See, e.g., Franke &
Ballam, supra note 247, at 348-49, 366-425 (1992) (evaluating claims of abuse in judicial
interpretation of UDAPs); Thomas, supra note 203, at 1-10, 17-23, 30-32 (arguing that
Pennsylvania's courts should rein in application of that state's UDAPs through, for example,
strict construction of standing limitations). While more limited, other sources have offered
criticisms of businesses as potential UDAP plaintiffs. See, e.g., Toward Greater Equality, supra
note 15, at 1627-39 (noting, for example, that businesses have greater bargaining power, less of
an incentive to defraud other businesses, and little need to create a deterrent effect).
254. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 26, at 264-72.
255. Id. 272-75.
256. Willis, supra note 79, at 731-32.
257. See Azmy, supra note 76, at 308-11.
258. See generally Willis, supra note 76, at 1184-99, 1230-55 (deconstructing the economic
model imputed to consumers engaged in home-loan borrowing).
259. See Disner & Jussim, supra note 176, at 42-46; Lannan, supra note 188, at 460-65,
471-79.
1298 [Vol. 43:1251
GOOD COP, BAD COP
interest, and (3) judicially approved settlements, would go far to
prevent the pre-Proposition 64 problems with representative
standing. As for potential new abuses from unscrupulous competitor
claims seeking only to obtain trade secret information or harass small
businesses, these problems are common to all litigation2 60 and should
be remedied through judicial sanctions and early summary judgment
motions.
3. Weighing Costs and Benefits
It is impossible to prove that representative UDAP standing for
businesses would have helped prevent the mortgage crisis, but there
are some indications that it could have had a positive effect. First,
structured mortgage regulations like TILA, RESPA, and HOEPA
failed to prevent lending abuses because the complicated nature of
these statutes allowed abusive lenders to find ways to originate
otherwise legal loans with unfair terms and procedures. Second, as
Fremont Investment & Loan shows, UDAPs can play an effective
role in regulating the mortgage market because the unfairness
standard gives courts the flexibility to find business practices unfair
even where they do not violate the law. Third, as the severity of the
mortgage crisis demonstrates, UDAPs, despite their inherent
benefits, failed to prevent the mortgage crisis because such claims
were not brought in sufficient numbers and were not sufficiently
successful.
Fourth, while consumers suffered a primary harm from
predatory lending practices, businesses suffered secondary harms
from lost market share because of a diminished capacity to compete.
Fifth, UDAPs prevent businesses from pursuing UDAP litigation
against competitors that are acting unfairly. Sixth, when the harmful
conduct of a competitor results in a diminished capacity to compete,
a business generally must choose between joining in the profitable
but harmful conduct or bringing suit to enjoin its competitor's bad
acts. Seventh, it is good public policy to facilitate industry self-
regulation before inviting government intervention and consumer
litigation. Finally, policy arguments advanced against representative
260. See BILL MCINTURFF & LORI WEIGEL, PUBLIC OPINION STRATEGIES, 2010 VOTERS'




UDAP standing are not applicable in the context of business-to-
business litigation.
The inherent benefits of representative UDAP standing for
businesses are therefore likely to outweigh its potential costs. This
Article proposes a practical method, supported by good policy,
through which to stop bad business practices by enhancing the
deterrent effect of UDAPs. Arguably, conferring representative
UDAP standing on market competitors would not have prevented the
mortgage crisis. Market competitors may have avoided litigation and
instead joined in profitable predatory lending practices. Nevertheless,
by precluding mortgage-industry actors from pursuing other options
through UDAP litigation, the law inadvertently pushed businesses
toward predatory lending. At the very least, the law should be
structured to give businesses a choice between joining in harmful
conduct and trying to prevent it.
V. CONCLUSION
By providing an expansive cause of action, state UDAP statutes
serve a critical function in deterring and curbing unfair or deceptive
business practices. However, a UDAP's effectiveness in protecting
consumers and promoting lawful business activity is partly a product
of the statute's standing provisions and available remedies.2 61 Of
potential plaintiffs, market competitors are well positioned with
industry expertise, commitment to the marketplace, and sufficient
resources to utilize UDAP statutes to police their own marketplaces.
Amending UDAPs to provide representative standing for
business plaintiffs-free of an injury-in-fact requirement-would
allow these groups greater freedom to make efficient and effective
use of UDAPs to self-regulate their own industries. Including
tailored remedial provisions would further empower business
competitors to take the lead in preventing unfair and unlawful
business activities like the predatory lending that contributed to the
mortgage crisis. As the risky lending at issue in Fremont Investment
& Loan shows,262 the bad practices of one business actor can cause
widespread harm to both its business competitors and the general
public.
261. See Sullenger, supra note 20, at 488.
262. See supra Part 1I.C.
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